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INTRODUCTION

An old adage maintains that "lawyers who try their cases with an
appeal in mind generally have to." The wisdom of this saying has
proved true through the years; however, the successful trial advocate
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must not only be able to persuade at trial, but must present cases in
such a manner that successes are defensible and losses are reversible.
Unfortunately, the constant duty to protect the record occurs during the heat of trial, when the niceties of appellate review are often
forgotten. The purpose of this article is to point out appellate pitfalls
that develop at the trial level, and to provide a quick reference guide
to the most common dangers confronting the trial practitioner.'
The decision to appeal is a difficult one and a judgment call that is
often made in anger and frustration, both by clients and by lawyers.2
However, a recent law review article has accurately assessed the statistics in Texas on some appeals. As a result, any lawyer contemplating appeal should invest time in reviewing those figures before making
the move toward appellate review.3
This article traces most of the procedural steps in a normal lawsuit,
and will indicate the proper method by which to preserve appeal, protect the record, and protect trial successes. The article also concentrates on many of the common problems encountered by trial
attorneys and some of the most recent cases involving protection of
the record for appellate review. Finally, the standard of review on
appeal from the various procedural rulings is also indicated. The subject matter of this article is limited to Texas civil practice with citations to Texas cases. As a result, reference to the supreme court or
courts of appeal are to Texas state courts, unless otherwise indicated.
II.

PRE-TRIAL RULINGS

A. Jurisdiction
1. Motion to Quash Service of Process
A motion to quash service of process is used when defects or irregularities occur in the actual service of process.4 The motion must be
filed before a general appearance since filing an answer waives the
1. Protecting the record is much like birth control. When adequate precautions are not
taken, surprising things occur. Much like pregnancies, the surprises show up nine (9) months
later in the form of an appellate opinion.
2. See Croft, The Decision to Appeal: The Birth of The Blues, FOR THE DEFENSE 14
(Feb. 1985).

3. See Gellis, Reasons for Case Reversals in Texas: An Analysis, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 299
(1985).
4. See Steve Tyrell Prod., Inc. v. Ray, 674 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no
writ) (motion to quash is proper method to challenge defective service or process).
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necessity for service and any defects in the actual citation.5 There is
no appeal from a ruling either way on this motion. If the motion to
quash is overruled, the movant must answer immediately. On the
other hand, if the motion is sustained, the movant is deemed to have
appeared, and must answer on the Monday next after the expiration
of twenty (20) days from the date of the order. 6 As a result, this motion is seldom used as the potential benefits are minimal.
2.

Special Appearance

A special appearance motion objects to jurisdiction over the person
or property of the defendant on grounds that such is not amenable to
process. 7 Rule 120a does not authorize the filing of a special appear8
ance for the purpose of raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction
since pleas to subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any stage of
the proceedings, including appeal.9 The special appearance motion

5. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 121; see also Parr v. First State Bank of San Diego, 507 S.W.2d
579, 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ) (Parr by receiving notice, filing answer,
and personally appearing at hearing waived necessity for service and could not challenge any
defects in citation); Hickey v. Silby, 304 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, no
writ) (defendant filed answer subject to motion to quash citation but answer subjected him to
jurisdiction of court and waived any defects).
6. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 122; see also Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 607, 608 (Sept. 21, 1985) (if citation or service is quashed on motion of defendant, such
defendant is deemed to have been duly served); Steve Tyrell Prod., Inc. v. Ray, 674 S.W.2d
430, 435 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ) (when service of citation is quashed by motion of
defendant, defendant is deemed to have entered his appearance at statutorily specified date in
future).
7. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
8. See Oliver v. Boutwell, 601 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1980, no writ).
The language in Rule 120a does not entitle one to file a special appearance for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See id. at 395; see also Steve Tyrell Prod., Inc. v. Ray, 674 S.W.2d 430,
435 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ) (Rule 120a is not used to complain about defective
process or defective service); C. W. Brown Mach. Shop, Inc. v. Stanley Mach. Corp., 670
S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ) (purpose of Rule 120a to allow defendant to attack court's jurisdiction over his person without constituting an appearance);
CueIlar v. Cuellar, 406 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ) (Rule
120a permits defendant to object only to court's jurisdiction over his person).
9. See, e.g., Texas Employment Comm'n v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Mach. Workers Local Union No. 782, 163 Tex. 135, 136, 352 S.W.2d 252, 253 (1961) (lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error and may be presented on appeal); Humble
Exploration Co. v. Browning, 677 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ) (complaint that judge was without authority to try case was not based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and thus could not be raised on appeal); Long v. Fox, 625 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised for first time on appeal since it is fundamental error).
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must be made in due order of pleading and filed before any answer or
other conduct that would be inconsistent with the motion. Failure to
observe these niceties results in a general appearance. ° A recent
supreme court case demonstrates this risk and the type of conduct
that waives a special appearance. In Liberty Enterprises,Inc. v. Moore
Transportation Co., Inc.,' I the supreme court reviewed a typical fact
situation involving a special appearance. Liberty appeared after a default judgment had been entered against it. Liberty filed a special appearance as well as a motion to set aside the default judgment and a
motion for new trial.12 In the motion for new trial, Liberty asserted,
3
"Liberty is ready to try this case when it is properly set for trial."'
Thereafter, the trial court entered an agreed order granting the new
trial. 14 Moore later rejected the agreement, and requested a ruling
that Liberty's appearance constituted a general appearance.15 The
supreme court agreed, specifically mentioning Liberty's conduct in
agreeing to the entry of an agreed order, and also mentioning the
statement that Liberty stood ready, "to try this case when it is properly set for trial."' 6
10. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Miller, 649 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no
writ) (unsworn answer denying jurisdiction of court did not comply with Rule 120a and constituted a general appearance); Stewart v. Walton Enter., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (unsworn written answer to contest jurisdiction and
counsel's personal appearance before court regarding such plea constituted general appearance); Austin Rankin Corp. v. Cadillac Pool Corp., 421 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1967, no writ) (defendant filed unsworn motion to dismiss, special appearance, and
motion to quash service of process, therefore, filing of unsworn motion to dismiss constituted
general appearance since not in proper order under Rule 120a). But see Carbonit Houston,
Inc. v. Exchange Bank, 628 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (Rule 120a permits amendment of special appearance, so unverified special appearance may be cured and not treated as general appearance); Stegall & Stegall v. Cohn, 592
S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ) (defendants properly amended
special appearance motion by verifying motion; therefore, general appearance not entered).
See generally Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction;Art. 2031b, The Texas "Long-Arm" Jurisdiction Statutes; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdictionin Texas And Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS
L. REV. 279, 317-18 (1964).
11. 690 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985).
12. See Liberty Enters., Inc. v. Moore Transp. Co., Inc., 679 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1984), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 690 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985). While the
supreme court opinion does not so indicate, the court of appeals' opinion makes it clear that
the motion for new trial and the motion to set aside the default judgment were filed subsequent
and subject to the special appearauce motion. See id. at 783.
13. Liberty Enters., Inc. v. Moore Transp. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1985).
14. See id. at 571.
15. See id. at 571.
16. Id. at 571. In this respect, Justice Robertson's opinion differs greatly from the opin-
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It is obvious that Liberty violated two cardinal rules of special appearance practice. First, it went forward with its case without having

the special appearance heard in due order. Second, Liberty's statement that it was ready to proceed with trial was certainly inconsistent

with its claim of lack of jurisdiction. As a result, it is obvious that
trial counsel must be cautious in taking any steps that might be inconsistent with its reliance on a special appearance.
Another recent supreme court case has redefined the purposes for
which a special appearance motion may be used. In Kawasaki Steel
Corp. v. Middleton, 7 Kawasaki filed a special appearance contesting
not only jurisdiction, but defects in the jurisdictional allegations in the
cross-petition, defects in the citation, and defects in service of process
as well.18 The supreme court ruled that a special appearance is not
the appropriate motion in which to include complaints of defects in
pleadings, defects in citation, and defects in service of process.1 9 In-

stead, the court indicated that these complaints were appropriate in a
motion to quash service of process.2'

ion of the Fort Worth Court of Appeals. The court of appeals held that an agreed order did
not invoke the jurisdiction of the court because the sole purpose of the motion for new trial
was to gain a hearing to test the jurisdiction. See Liberty Enters., Inc. v. Moore Transp. Co.,
Inc., 679 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 690
S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985). The court of appeals' opinion stated, in a very commonsensical
quote, "to hold as the appellee [Moore] contends would be to completely deny a defaulting
party the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the court after judgment, except through a
collateral attack. This would have the effect of deeming a default as a general appearance by a
party, leaving that party no recourse but to invoke the court's jurisdiction before it could
challenge that jurisdiction." Id. at 783. In addressing the problem of whether Liberty's consent in allowing the agreed order to be entered and conduct in filing the motion for new trial
constituted a waiver of its special appearance, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals further held,
"to hold that you must invoke jurisdiction to challenge the jurisdiction of the court, is to
compel compliance with the infamous 'Catch 22' which Rule 120a was intended to prevent."
Id. at 783. Obviously, the supreme court rejected these arguments in overturning the lower
court's opinion. The result is to put the defaulting party in a dilemma. To overturn a default
judgment, the defaulting party may risk its personal jurisdictional rights.
17. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607, 608 (Sept. 21, 1985).
18. See id. at 608-609.
19. See id. at 609.
20. See id. at 609. It seems clear that a defendant may still file a Rule 120a special appearance, and subsequently attack service or process and defects in citation. However, the
attack on jurisdictional allegations in the petition creates another problem. It would seem
logical that the defendant is entitled to know on what grounds jurisdiction is being asserted by
plaintiff. The supreme court opinion, however, indicates that this is not necessarily true, and
cites the general proposition that the non-resident defendant has the burden of proof to negate
all basis of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 609; see also Wheat v. Toone, 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
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The failure to file a special appearance waives any complaint of jurisdiction over the person or property on appeal.21 Additionally, the
special appearance motion must be verified. 22 In fact, an unverified
motion may constitute a general appearance and waive the special appearance unless it is amended to cure the defect.23 In at least one
instance, a court has allowed an amendment, after the actual special
appearance hearing, to cure the defect.24 One of the most common
errors in special appearance practice is the failure to document the
record that a ruling was requested and an order entered. Failure to
obtain a ruling waives any right to challenge the overruling of a special appearance. 25
If the special appearance motion is sustained, the cause is dis-

missed, and a final and appealable judgment results.26 However, in a
case of multiple defendants, the order sustaining the special appear-

ance of one party is interlocutory unless it is severed from the other
portions of the suit and reduced to final judgment.27 If the trial
court's decision is for the plaintiff and the motion is overruled, the
point of error can be carried forward on appeal only when a final
101, 101 (Dec. 14, 1985) (special appearance cannot be used to challenge jurisdictional allegations in petition).
21. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
22. See Carbonit Houston, Inc. v. Exchange Bank, 628 S.W.2d 826, 828 (rex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.) (Rule 120a requires special appearance be made by
sworn motion); see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a ("special appearance shall be made by sworn
motion").
23. See, e.g., Carbonit Houston, Inc. v. Exchange Bank, 628 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (special appearance may be amended to
cure defects); Stegall & Stegall v. Cohn, 592 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1979, no writ) (special appearance defects cured by amendment); Dennett v. First Continental
Inv. Corp., 559 S.W.2d 384, 385-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) (unsworn special
appearance, resulting in general appearance, may be amended to cure defects).
24. See Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Hotton Aviation Co., Inc., 620 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
25. See Harris v. Thompson Buick, 601 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no
writ) (record must reflect relief was requested); see also Commercial Credit Equip. Co. v. West,
677 S.W.2d 669, 673 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.) (general rule states record
must disclose specific relief requested); accord Cogburn v. Harbour, 657 S.W.2d 432, 432 (Tex.
1983) (failure to express objection on record waives alleged error).
26. See Simonsen v. Simonsen, 414 S.W.2d 54, 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, no
writ) (if objection to jurisdiction is sustained, appropriate dismissal order will be entered); see
also TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a (if court sustains objection, appropriate order will be entered).
27. See Sullivan v. Tab Sales Co., 576 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1978, no writ). The same is true of the special appearance of a third-party defendant. See
Cessna Aviation Co. v. Hotton Aviation Co., 620 S.W.2d 231, 233 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
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judgment is entered. If the defendant is positive of its position, it can
refuse to go forward by failing to fie an answer, thus causing an order
of dismissal and a final appealable judgment. In instances where the
law and facts are clear, this refusal will create a quick appeal and not
require the waste of a trial on the merits of the case.2"
B.

Venue

The 1983 changes to article 1995 have dramatically altered venue
practice in Texas.29 As this article goes to print, the courts have not
written on most of the expected problems. However, revised article
1995, subsection 4(d)(2) provides that, "on appeal from the trial on
the merits, if venue was improper it shall in no event be harmless
error and shall be reversible error."' 30 This new subsection which
abolishes the harmless error rule in venue cases makes protection of
the record for appeal crucial.3"
A question may well arise as to whether the legislature had the
power to abolish, in part, the harmless error rule as stated in Rule
434.32 Previously, the legislature relinquished its rule making powers

in civil judicial proceedings to the supreme court.33 It is pursuant to
this act that the supreme court promulgates the rules of civil procedure, including Rule 434 - the harmless error rule. There are pro
and con arguments as to whether the legislature could repeal the
harmless error rule in venue cases. However, practitioners would do
28. Obviously, this type of tactic is risky and any defense counsel contemplating such a

step should ensure that its malpractice coverage is in effect.
29. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon Supp. 1985). This article was
completed while article 1995 was the effective provision on Texas venue law. In late December
of 1985 the Texas Legislature implemented the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This
new annotated Code includes most statutory provisions controlling civil trials, including
venue. Article 1995 is now embodied, in total and without alteration, in sections 15.001 thru
15.065 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEx. Cv. PRAC. & REM.
§§ 15,001-.065 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The authors and editors have chosen not to change the
citations in this article since no changes were made in article 1995's venue provisions. The
practitioner should, however, note the codification change and adjust citations accordingly.
30. Tax. REv. CIv STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
31. For a review of the legislative history behind this particular provision, see generally
Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 878 (1984).
32. See Tix.R. Civ. P. 434. Rule 434 provides in the pertinent part "that no judgment
shall be reversed on appeal... unless the appellate court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of the appellant as was reasonably
calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment." Id 434.
33. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1731a (Vernon 1962).
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well to read the legislative history of revised article 1995 before taking
either position.34
Revised article 1995 was a compromise bill negotiated between and
drafted by the Texas Association of Defense Counsel (TADC) representing the defense bar, and the Texas Trial Lawyers Association
(TTLA) representing the plaintiff bar. 35 The negotiations between the
two, during the 68th Legislature, were carried on under the watchful
eye of Jack Pope, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Texas. 36 The language of section 4(d)(2) was the basis of the compromise between the TADC and the TTLA. The TADC agreed to language abolishing interlocutory appeals and evidentiary venue
hearings, if subsection 4(d)(2) was included to prevent the possibility
of fraud. 37 All parties, including the House and Senate drafters, the
Chief Justice, and the TADC and TTLA were aware of the compromise and the intent of the bill.38 As a result, it is obvious that the
supreme court, although certainly not a party to the compromise, was
heavily involved in the bill that eventually passed. This is certainly
some evidence that the supreme court knew and perhaps approved of
the compromise which included the abolition of the harmless error
rule on venue issues.39 One commentator states that former Chief
Justice Pope was consulted as to whether the language of subsection
4(d)(2) was sufficient to avoid the harmless error rule in venue cases.
Chief Justice Pope's response was that the language was sufficient.' °
However, the court did not amend Rule 434 at the time Rules 86,
87, 88, and 89 were promulgated to reflect the new venue practice
34. See Price,New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 855, 878
(1984); see also Caperton, Schoenbaum & Anderson, Anatomy of The Venue Bill 47 TEx. B.J.
244, 244-45 (1984).
35. See Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY's L.J. 855,
856-57 (1984).
36. See id. at 857, 863-64.
37. See id. at 878.
38. See id at 879.
39. See id at 878.
40. See id. at 879. The article states:
The obvious purpose for this language [subsection 4(d)(2)] was to expressly prohibit appellate courts, in as unambiguous and strong a language as possible, from resorting to the
'harmless error' rule under traditional appellate-review standards when venue was improper. Chief Justice Pope was asked his opinion on the sufficiency of this language to
accomplish its goal, and he agreed that the statute could be no stronger or clearer in its
mandate.
Id at 879.
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under revised article 1995. The supreme court's failure to amend
Rule 434 might be read as an intention to keep the harmless error rule
in venue cases regardless of subsection 4(d)(2)'s mandate. On the
other hand, the failure to make a change could indicate the court felt
that the passage of the statute made the rule change unnecessary. Regardless, a supreme court case indicates that when a statute and rule
of procedure conflict, the statute is controlling, even if it is partially
procedural in nature. In Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen4 the supreme
court was faced with an interesting statute which allowed evidence of
a ceremonial remarriage of the surviving spouse in a suit brought
under the wrongful death act.4 2 The district court refused to admit
evidence of the ceremonial remarriage, and while the court of appeals
had found such exclusion error, it nonetheless found that the error
was harmless. 3 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals,
holding that the error was reversible." The supreme court reasoned
that when the legislature has enacted a statute deeming certain evidence admissible, courts cannot thereafter determine that the exclusion of that evidence was harmless error.45 In other cases, courts have
similarly held that the harmless error rule is inapplicable in situations
where the legislature has enacted mandatory rules of procedure.46
Additionally, the Texas Constitution reserves to the legislature the
right to promulgate venue laws. 7 Therefore, it is arguable that any
attempts by the court to change the statute through the use of proce41. 526 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. 1975).

42. See id. at 525; see also TEx. REv. Civ.

STAT. AN . art. 4675a (Vernon Supp. 1985)
(actual ceremonial remarriage of surviving spouse is admissible).
43. See Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 526 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Tex. 1975).
44. See id. at 525. The court went on to state:
The legislature has decreed in clear and explicit terms that evidence of the actual ceremonial remarriage of a surviving spouse is admissible in the statutorily authorized wrongful
death action. The legislative determination forecloses judicial inquiry into the effect upon
the fact finder of evidence that the surviving spouse is ceremonially remarried. It is the
duty of the courts to apply the law as declared by the legislature, and to give effect to its
stated purpose or plan... article 4675(a) would be rendered ineffectual by an independent
judicial determination that disregard of its terms in a given instance was harmless error.
Id.at 525.
45. See id. at 525.
46. See Few v. Charter Oaks Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971); C. E. Duke's
Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Oakley, 526 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Rule 434 is applicable where trial court failed to comply with supreme
court rule, even though legislature has enacted mandatory rules).
47. See TEx. CONST. art. III, § 45.
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dural rules would be unconstitutional."8 As a result, any arguments
that the legislature did not have the authority to repeal in part Rule
434 will have a difficult time succeeding.
1. Plaintiff's Original Petition
Under the new venue scheme, the plaintiff's original petition assumes a much greater importance for venue purposes than ever
before. In fact, the petition is the vehicle by which the plaintiff pleads
not only his cause of action, but also the venue facts which will sustain the plaintiff's chosen forum. 49 Furthermore, under the new statute, there is no necessity for the plaintiff to actually prove his cause of
action in a separate evidentiary hearing.50 As a result, the importance
of the pleadings is crucial.
In instances where the defendant does not file a motion to transfer,
the plaintiff's original petition will contain the only factual venue allegations the trial court can consider. If a motion to transfer does not
contain "specific" denials of the plaintiff's venue facts, the court then
determines whether the venue facts have been "properly plead." 51
Article 1995 does not include the definition of "proper pleading."
The best definition is probably whether the pleading would support a
default judgment. 52 In that regard, the only factual pleadings necessary to support a default judgment are factual allegations that support
the elements of the cause of action. 3 However, if a motion to transfer
is filed specifically denying the venue facts in the plaintiff's original
petition, the plaintiff must make "prima facie" proof of venue facts in
48. See id. § 45. Also, the power to change venue was unknown at common law, therefore, the power must be a matter of statutory or constitutional law. See Buchanan v. Crow,
241 S.W. 563, 565-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1922, no writ) (cited in interpretive commentary to section 45 of article 3 to the Texas Constitution).
49. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(2)(b).
50. See TEX. REV.CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § (4)(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
51. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
52. See Hazel, Venue Procedurein the Trial Court, 47 TEX. B.J. 625, 626 (1984) (proper
pleading for venue should support default judgment); see also Comment, "Horse & Buggy" to
"HorselessCarriage"--TexasRolls OutIts New Venue Model: A Practitioner'sGuide to Article
1995, 15 TEX. TECH L. REv. 917, 934 (1984) (petition sufficient for default judgment is properly pled for venue purposes).
53. See Comment, "Horse & Buggy" to "Horseless Carriage"--TexasRolls Out Its New
Venue Model: A Practitioner'sGuide to Article 1995, 15 TEx. TECH L. REv.917, 934 (1984)
(to support default judgment plaintiff must only plead facts supporting elements of cause of
action).
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either affidavits or venue discovery to sustain venue.54
2.

Motion to Transfer Venue

Any venue rights of a defendant are waived if a motion to transfer
venue is not filed, "prior to or concurrently" with any other pleading
except a special appearance motion." This requirement that venue be
raised in the "due order of pleading" is carried forward from the old
rules.56 The other requisites of a motion to transfer under new Rule
86 are, however, radically different than the previous rules for pleas of
privilege. 57 Rule 86 provides that the motion shall state:
a. The action should be transferred to another specified county of
proper venue.
b. The county where the action is pending is not a proper county; or
... mandatory venue of the action in another county is prescribed by
one or more specific statutory provisions which shall be clearly
designated.
c. The legal and factual basis for the transfer of the action should be
stated.58

The motion to transfer should also include a specific denial of all
venue facts in the plaintiff's original petition that the defendant believes to be untrue.59 The reason for the defendant's denial is that
Rule 87(3)(a) provides that all venue facts are taken as true by the
trial court unless specifically denied. 60 The rule requires a specific denial of the venue facts, and at this writing, no case has construed the
term "specifically denied." Obviously, problems may arise with this
term. For example, would a denial which stated, "The defendant denies each and every venue fact pled in the plaintiff's original peti54. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
55. See TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § (4)(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
56. See Texas Highway Dept. v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. 1967). Although not
a venue case, the supreme court decision in Liberty Enters, Inc. v. Moore Transp. Co., Inc., 690
S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985), demonstrates a renewed interest by the supreme court in the concept
of due order of pleadings.
57. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(1). Caution should be used as it appears that any pre-trial
motions such as a motion to quash service, plea in abatement, or plea in bar, will waive any
venue rights if illed
prior to a motion to transfer. See id. 86(l). Additionally, Rule 93 has been
revised eliminating any provisions requiring a denial, "that the suit is not commenced in the
proper county." Id. 93(a).
58. TEx. R. Civ. P. 86(3).
59. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
60. See id. 87(3)(a).
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tion," be adequate? Hopefully not over objection; however, the best
solution is to require the same specificity that is required for response
to motions for summary judgment under Rule 166-A, 61 or the specificity required for special exceptions under Rule 91.62 In addition to
denying venue facts alleged by the plaintiff, the defendant should
plead venue facts to support its request to transfer venue. The same
standard of "properly pled" also applies to the defendant's
allegations.63
3. Response to Motion to Transfer
The rules do not require a response to the motion to transfer. However, failure to file a response can result in severe consequences. If the
defendant has specifically denied any of the plaintiff's venue. facts in
accordance with Rule 87(3)(a), the plaintiff must proceed to make
prima facie proof of the denied venue facts through the introduction
of affidavits or venue discovery. 6 Additionally, the plaintiff may
want to specifically deny the venue facts pled by the defendant to likewise prevent the defendant's pleaded facts from being taken as true.
As a result, the plaintiff should almost always file a response either to
provide prima facie proof, if necessary, to allege additional venue
facts, or to dispute the defendant's venue allegations.
4.

Prima Facie Proof

As mentioned above, Rule 87 was completely revised to include the
concept of "prima facie proof." In this regard, Rule 87(3)(a) provides: "all venue facts, when properly pleaded, shall be taken as true
unless specifically denied by the adverse party. When a venue fact is
specifically denied, the party pleading the venue fact must make
prima facie proof of that venue fact."' 65 Prima facie proof is a phrase
61. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 161-A(c). This rule states in the pertinent part "the motion for
summary judgment shall state the specific grounds therefore." Id. 161-A(c).
62. TEx. R. Civ. P. 91. This rule states "[a] special exception shall not only point out the
particular pleading excepted to, but it shall also point out intelligibly and with particularity the
defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the allegations in the
pleading excepted to." Id 91.
63. The test should be whether the allegations would either defeat a judgment for the
plaintiff, if the plaintiff's cause of action is being questioned, or whether the defendant's allegations standing alone would support a transfer of venue, if the plaintiff's venue facts are being
challenged.
64. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
65. Id. 87(3)(a).
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with no fixed meaning 66, and no Texas court has yet defined its meaning in a venue context. It is the authors' opinion that prima facie
proof should be nothing more than that degree of proof or measure of
evidence which would ordinarily allow the issue to go to the factfinder.
If no "specific denial" is filed in response to "properly pled" venue
facts in any pleading, those facts will be taken as true. Once facts are
specifically denied by either party, the party pleading the venue facts
must make prima facie proof of those facts.
5. Proof
There is no longer an evidentiary hearing on any venue matter.67
As a result, proof of venue facts is crucial, and errors in proof can
wreck appeals. Proof of venue facts can now come from three
sources: (a) affidavits,68 (b) duly proved attachments to affidavits,69
and (c) Rule 88 discovery.7° In every instance, the pleadings will
form not only the basic framework, but also will constitute the actual
venue proof unless specifically denied. 71 As stated above, no additional proof is needed unless the venue facts are specifically denied by
the opponent's pleadings. However, once a denial is presented, proof
of the denied venue fact must be presented to overcome the denial.
a. Affidavits
Affidavits may be used as proof of proper venue in the same manner
they are used in summary judgment procedure under Rule 166-A.
Specifically, the affidavits must be made on personal knowledge,
demonstrate that the affiant is competent to testify, and set forth specific facts that are admissible in evidence. 72 The same pitfalls exist in
66. See Valley Forge Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 579 S.W.2d 271, 276 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § (4)(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985). Rather,
the court determines venue matters from pleadings and affidavits. See id. § (4)(d)(1).
68. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
69. See id. 87(3)(a).

70. See id. 88. Rule 88 provides that "reasonable discovery is permitted on any issues
relevant to a determination of proper venue." Id. 88.

71. See id. 87(3)(a).
72. See id. 87(3)(a). The personal knowledge requirement is discussed definitively in a
1962 Texas Supreme Court case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 234

(Tex. 1962).
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this procedure as exist in summary judgment practice.13 For example,
legal conclusions in an affidavit are generally not admissible and will
not sustain a venue ruling. However, the venue rules do not require
that objections to the form of proof or the admissibility of proof need
be made to the trial court in writing, as is the practice with summary
judgment proceedings. As a result, some practitioners may attempt to
raise evidentiary problems for the first time on appeal. This is a game
that will probably end in tears.74 Appellate courts, despite the "no
harmless error rule," will be reluctant to allow litigants to raise evidentiary points for the first time on appeal. Additionally, the "no
harmless error rule" only applies to the trial court's actual ruling and
not to errors in the motion to transfer hearing.75 The best practice is
to raise any objections to venue proof at the hearing.
b.

Attachments to Affidavits

Rule 87(3)(a) specifically declares "duly proved attachments" to affidavits are venue proof.76 Practitioners should be aware that a whole
body of law has developed around the use of attachments to affidavits
in summary judgment practice." These same procedures will likely
apply to venue practice.
c.

Rule 88 Discovery

Rule 88 provides that "reasonable discovery" may be sought and
used only on those issues relating to venue. 78 Discovery may be had
in the form of depositions, requests for admissions, interrogatories, or
requests for discovery. Conducting such discovery does not waive the
defendant's venue rights. Rule 88 discovery may be presented to the
trial court to aid its determination. 79 However, the discovery must be
73. See infra Section II J(2) of this article for problems with the use of affidavits.
74. The summary judgment practice rules deal with waiver of the right to object and are
directed at the parties. However, article 1995, section (4)(d)(1) is directed at the courts. This
rule creating the harshness of "no harmless error" does not deal with "how venue was determined, but, whether the actual decision was correct." As a result, the courts will probably
look with a suspect eye towards practitioners who leave technical arguments for appeal. The
real issue will always be whether the decision was actually correct.
75. See Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 855, 878
(1984).
76. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
77. See infra discussion in Section II J(2) under summary judgment practice.
78. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 88.
79. See id. 88.
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incorporated or attached to affidavits of "a witness or attorney who
has knowledge of the discovery."" ° It is important to note that this
procedure differs substantially from summary judgment practice. In
summary judgment practice, it is permissible to simply file the discovery with the court rather than attach the discovery to an affidavit. 81
In this regard, an attorney having knowledge of discovery can be the
82
attorney of record or a member of a law firm representing a party.
A witness who has knowledge of discovery would certainly include
the deponent and might also include a court reporter or others present at the deposition. 3
6. Erroneous Venue Ruling Cured by Trial Evidence
The provisions of article 1995, subsection (4)(d)(2), stating that a
trial court's error in venue matters will not be harmless error, may lull
many practitioners into a false sense of complacency. The same subsection of the article provides that when reviewing the venue ruling,
"the appellate court shall consider the entire record, including trial on
the merits." 4 As a result, a trial court's ruling which was incorrect at
the time that it was rendered, may be corrected as evidence is introduced during the trial. 85 For example, if the trial court overruled a
motion to transfer when the defendant specifically denied the venue
facts of plaintiff's petition and the plaintiff presented no venue proof,
error would be obvious. However, if the plaintiff then proceeds to
trial and introduces evidence which would properly establish venue,
80. Id. 88. See generally Statute Note, Venue Procedurein Texas: An Analysis of the
1983 Amendments to The Rules of Civil ProcedureGoverning Venue Practice Under the New
Venue Statute, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 241, 249-50 (1984) (discussion relating to discovery and
venue under rule 88).
81. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
82. See Hazel, Venue Procedure in the Trial Court, 47 TEX. B.J. 625, 626 (1984); Comment, "Horse & Buggy" to "Horseless Carriage"-TexasRolls Out Its New Venue Model: A
Practitioner'sGuide to Article 1995, 15 TEX. TECH L. REv. 917, 938-40 (1984).
83. See Hazel, Venue Procedurein the Trial Court, 47 TEX. B.J. 625, 628 (1984). However, as Professor Hazel suggests in his article, the courts probably would be more strict with
who may be a proper witness rather than which attorney may be a proper affiant. See id at
628.
84. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985); see also
Neidert v. Bronk Hawkins Dozers, 681 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, no writ)
(in passing on venue, court of appeals reviews all evidence).
85. See Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 855,
878-79 (1984); Comment, "Horse & Buggy" to "Horseless Carriage"--TexasRolls Out Its New
Venue Model: A Practitioner'sGuide to Article 1995, 15 TEx. TECH L. REv. 917, 940-41
(1984).
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the error is corrected. 86 The reverse is true as well. If the plaintiff's
venue facts proved by prima facie proof at the venue level are proved
at trial on the merits to be incorrect, the entire case must be reversed
for a new trial in the proper county.87 Although the statute does not
address how to preserve error in these situations, the best practice is
to renew the motion to transfer, based upon the trial evidence. 88
7.

Res Judicata Rule

Once venue has been determined in a suit, that determination is
deemed to be conclusive in any subsequent refilings of the same suit.89
In some cases, after a disappointing venue determination, innovative
plaintiff's counsel have nonsuited their causes of action and subsequently refiled in another county in an attempt to avoid the judge's
venue determination in the first suit. Under former article 1995, such
practice was prohibited under the so called "res judicata rule." 90 The
res judicata rule was adopted to prevent defendants from being subjected to the harrassment and expense of presenting their venue
claims in a number of successive forums in response to the plaintiff's
nonsuits and subsequent refilings of the exact same cause of action in
different counties. The rule provided that once a plea of privilege was
sustained and the cause transferred, the venue determination was res
judicata to a later filing of the same cause of action.
Revised article 1995 does not contain similar language; however, at
86. See Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 855,

878-79 (1984); Comment, "Horse & Buggy" to "HorselessCarriage"--TexasRolls Out Its New
Venue Model: A Practitioner'sGuide to Article 1995, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 917, 94041
(1984).
87. See Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 855,
878-79 (1984); Comment, "Horse & Buggy" to "HorselessCarriage"--TexasRolls Out Its New
Venue Model.- A Practitioner'sGuide to Article 1995, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 917, 940-41
(1984).
88. The alternative is to allow the defendant to raise the issue for the first time on appeal.
This practice would require an additional trial with the attendant waste of time and increase in

costs and frustrate the statute's intentions.
89. See Hendrick Medical Center v. Howell, 690 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
no writ); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 87 (article 1995 allows only one venue determination in a
cause).
90. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Dallas v. Hannay, 123 Tex. 203, 203, 67 S.W.2d 215, 215
(Tex. 1933) (question of venue is res judicata as to venue in subsequent suit on same cause of
action); Joiner v. Stephens, 457 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, no writ)
(venue claim is res judicata in successive actions); Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Gibson, 372
S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, no writ) (venue claim in successive action
is res judicata).
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least one case has held that the res judicata rule still has effect due to
other language in the new statute. In Hendrick Medical Center v.
Howell,91 the Dallas Court of Appeals indicated that if venue is raised
in a motion to transfer and the court sustains the motion to transfer, a
subsequent nonsuit by a plaintiff does not extinguish the venue ruling
made by the prior court. The Dallas Court of Appeals rested its rationale on Rule 87 which provides that there is no rehearing after an
initial determination of venue is made. To hold otherwise, argued the
court, "would not only contravene legislative intent but would permit
a plantiff to nonsuit-and-refile his way through Texas' 254 counties
until he attained a venue determination to his liking. "92
8. One Venue Determination Per Customer?
An oddity exists under the new venue practice which creates a trap
for unwary counsel. Rule 87 provides that there is no rehearing after
an initial venue determination is made by the court.93 Thereafter, no
party, including subsequent joined parties, can raise venue rights
through a motion to transfer.94 Even if the parties do raise such a
right, the court is without power to determine that venue right. 95
This can result in an absurd situation. That situation is made clear by
the case of Hendrick Medical Center v. Howell.96 In Hendrick, the
plaintiff filed suit against several defendants in Jefferson County.97
The defendants moved for a motion to transfer the cause to Jones
County. 98 After the motion was granted, but before the subsequent
transfer, the plaintiff dismissed the cause of action without prejudice. 99 Thereafter, the plaintiff refiled in Dallas County alleging the
same causes of action pled in the first suit."co The named defendants
made a motion to transfer which was overruled.101 After that venue
91. 690 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).

92. Id. at 44.
93. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 87(5).
94. See id. 87(5).
95. See id. 87(5); see also Hendrick Medical Center v. Howell, 690 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) (once venue has been determined in cause, that determination is
conclusive).
96. 690 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
97. See id. at 43.
98. See id. at 43.
99. See id. at 43.
100. See id. at 43.
101. See id.at 43.
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determination was made in Dallas County, the plaintiff joined a second set of defendants who also made a motion to transfer which was
denied because Rule 87 provides that only one venue determination
can be made by the court.1 "2
The second set of defendants in Hendrick were forced to make a
motion to transfer to ensure that their venue rights were not waived
on appeal. However, the Dallas Court of Appeals properly ruled that
under article 1995, the trial court could not hear the actual motion to
transfer. As a result, the lesson is clear; subsequently joined parties
must make a motion to transfer to preserve their venue rights on appeal. However, trial courts are not permitted to hear any motion to
transfer after an initial venue determination has been made.
Another practical problem exists with the language of Rule 87(5)
which prohibits rehearing of a motion to transfer. Commentators
have disagreed as to whether the trial court may vacate or rescind its
venue ruling if, during the trial of the cause, it becomes obvious that
venue is improper. 0 3a The better rule is that the trial court may vacate its order."° Rule 87(5) refers to filing of new motions to transfer
rather than the renewing of a previously filed motion. Also, judicial
economy would dictate that if the harmless error rule does not apply
in venue matters and the trial on the merits demonstrates improper
venue, the expense of an appeal and retrial should not be incurred by
either party.
9.
a.

Appeal
No Interlocutory Appeal or Writ of Mandamus
New article 1995 expressly abolishes interlocutory appeals.105 Additionally, at least one Texas court has now held that a writ of mandamus will not allow an appellate court to order a trial judge to transfer
102. See id. at 43. The second set of defendants then brought a writ of mandamus which
was denied. Tax. R. Civ. P. 87(5).
103. See Comment, "Horse & Buggy" to "Horseless Carriage"--TexasRolls Out Its New
Venue Model: A Practitioner'sGuide to Article 1995, 15 TEx. TECH L. REV. 917, 939-940
(1984).
104. See id. at 940 n. 186; see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 87(5) (referring to new motions to
transfer rather than reviewing motion already filed).
105. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § (4)(d)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1985); see also
Wells v. Metro Fina Co., 677 S.W.2d 251, 252-53 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ) (interlocutory appeal not permitted). The legislature also repealed that portion of article 2008 that
included venue in the list of matters for interlocutory appeal. See TEx. REv. CIrv. STAT. ANN.
art. 2008 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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the cause even when venue is improper in the county where the suit is
pending.10 6 In Hendrick, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered a
case that demonstrated the harshness of the rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals. Although the court found that venue was conclusively
established in Jones County, Texas, and that the trial judge in Dallas
County refused to transfer the case to Jones County, the court of appeals held it was without power to issue a writ of mandamus due to
the language in the statute regarding interlocutory appeals.1"7
b. Standard of Review
Under revised article 1995, the standard of review in venue cases
has changed from the traditional standards of appellate review in
Texas. The standard is whether venue was proper in the county
where the lawsuit was tried.108 Under the old rule and in most other
procedural matters, the standard is whether the court erred in establishing venue. 3 9 However, during the drafting of article 1995, this
standard was considered and rejected.110 Obviously, the new standard is less strict and will result in more venue reversals.
10.

Motion to Transfer Because of Inability to Obtain
Impartial Trial

Rules 257-259 control motions to tranfer venue in circumstances
106. See Hendrick Medical Center v. Howell, 690 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985, no writ). However, Hendrick must be read in connection with Ramcon Corp. v. American Steel Bldg. Co., 668 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ). In Ramcon, the El
Paso Court of Appeals strongly suggested that it had mandamus power to review a venue
determination. See id. at 461. But see Ogburn v. Blackburn, No. 85-0254-CV (Tex. App.Amarillo, Sept. 18, 1985, no writ) (not yet reported) (appellate court will not issue mandamus
to correct trial court ruling on motion to transfer because creates interlocutory appeal of venue
issues).
107. See Hendrick Medical Center v. Howell, 690 S.W.2d 42, 45-46 (rex. App.-Dallas
1985, no writ); see also TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § (4)(d)(1) (Vernon Supp.
1985). Article 1995, section (4)(d)(1) expressly provides that "[n]o interlocutory appeal shall
ie." Id. 1995, § (4)(d)(1).
108. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § (4)(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
109. See Price, New Texas Venue Statute: Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 855,
878 (1984). For example, the old standard considered abuse of discretion and insufficiency of
the evidence. See id. at 878.
110. See id. at 878. In preparing the appellate complaint, the practitioner should be cautious. Although the standard under subsection (4)(d)(2) is obvious, the trial court may have
committed other error in the venue proceeding regarding time limitations. Therefore, these
errors should be drafted as traditional points of error.
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where a party alleges that it cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.III
This type of transfer of venue is unique because it is available to any
party, including the plaintiff, who originally picked the forum." 2 The
procedure under Rule 257, unlike regular venue practice, specifies the
types of affidavits that are required to accompany the motion to transfer. 1 3 Rule 258 provides that the movant's motion must be granted
unless the respondent files an affidavit of a credible person attacking
(a) the credibility of the movant's affiants, (b) the affiant's knowledge
of the facts recited in the affidavits, or (c) the truth of the affiant's
statements.11 4 If the movant's motion is attacked under Rule 258,
reasonable discovery may be conducted and presented to the court
using the same affidavit procedure provided in Rule 88 discovery. 1 5
As with the regular venue practice, there is no evidentiary hearing
and no interlocutory appeal.
There is a serious question, however, as to whether a Rule 257 motion to transfer must be made in the due order of pleading.I1 6 Revised
article 1995, section (4)(c) provides that a motion to transfer on the
grounds that an impartial trial cannot be had must be made in the due
order of pleading.117 The rules are silent on the issue. However, as a
practical matter, the prejudice and resultant inability to obtain a fair
trial (generally caused by pre-trial publicity) usually arise long after
the answer is filed. In fact, Rule 87 recognizes the difference between
ordinary motions to transfer and Rule 257 motions. 18
Because old article 1995 made no reference to Rule 257 practice,
111. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 257 (provides that either party may move for transfer of
venue for any of the causes stated therein) with id. 86 (provides by implication that only defendant may move for transfer of venue).
112. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 257. Rule 257 requires that the movant and at least three

credible residents of the county in which the suit is pending supply affidavits. See id. 257.
These affidavits must state at least one of the four grounds supplied in the statute as to why the
movant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the county where the cause is pending. See
id. 257.
113. See id. 257.
114. See id. 258.
115. See id. 258; see also id. 88 (rule regarding discovery and venue).
116. See Keltner, Protectingthe RecordforAppeal, ADVANCED CIVIL TRIAL COURSE, at

U-8 (State Bar of Texas 1985).
117. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
118. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(5). Subsection 5 states the general rule that no further motions to transfer may be heard after a venue determination has been made. See id. 87(5).

However, Rule 257 motions to transfer are noted as an exception to Rule 87(5), giving rise to
the argument that Rule 257 motions to transfer need not be made in the due order of pleading.
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motions under Rule 257 were not required to be made in the due
order of pleading. 1 9 Also, it is interesting to note that the supreme
court has made minor modifications to conform Rule 257 with revised
article 1995, but failed to address this potential problem. 120 Despite
the language of article 1995,121 common sense dictates that a Rule 257
motion need not be made in the due order of pleading, especially since
a plaintiff is entitled to make the motion.
11.

Nonliability Declaratory Judgment Actions

In a recent case involving a declaratory judgment action regarding
the liability of a hospital, the supreme court indicated that the "'real
plaintiff' has a traditional right to choose the time and place of the
suit."' 2 2 In Abor v. Black, 123 the supreme court was faced with an
interesting question and reached a curious result. The injured party
in the medical malpractice case filed suit against a drug company in
Harris County.' 24 The drug company removed the case to federal
court in the Eastern District of Texas. After the case was removed to
federal court, the plaintiff joined Scott & White Hospital alleging
malpractice. The hospital filed a motion to dismiss for want of diversity jurisdiction, which was granted. Thereafter, the hospital brought
a declaratory judgment action in Bell County, where the hospital was
located, asking for a declaration of nonliability. The plaintiff filed a
plea in abatement, urging that the suit was an improper use of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, which was denied by the trial court. The
supreme court ruled that the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act, "appears to give the courts jurisdiction over declarations of non-liability
of a potential defendant in a tort action ....
"125 The supreme court,
however, further ruled that the plea in abatement should nonetheless
have been sustained because the exercise of jurisdiction, "deprived the
real plaintiff of the traditional right to choose the time and place of

119. See City of Abilene v. Downs, 367 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. 1963) (motion could not
be denied even if filed after movant announced ready for trial); see also Atchison, T. S. F. Ry.
Co. v. Holloway, 479 S.W.2d 700, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e)
(motion under Rule 257 may be filed at any time).
120. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 257.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 4(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. 1985).
695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985).
See id. at 566.
Id. at 566.
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The court cited no authority for the "traditional right" proposition. However, it is evident that suits to declare non-liability of
defendants should be abated so the plaintiff can choose the time of
filing and the venue of the lawsuit.
suit.

' 126

C.

Pleadings

The pleadings generally frame the parameters of the lawsuit.17 Increasingly, pleadings also form the basis for appellate review, and as a
result, should be drafted carefully to cover all the relief and all the
defenses sought by the pleader. For example, the pleadings form the
basis for venue determination. 28 Additionally, the relevancy of evidence is determined from the pleadings, as well as the court's submission of special issues. In forming a judgment, the court must finally
ensure that the relief granted was sought in the pleadings and supported by the pleadings.
1. Standard
The purpose of the pleadings is to inform the court and the opposing party of the causes of action and defenses alleged so as to allow
the preparation of a response. 129 As a result, the standard for reviewing pleadings is whether they conform with the directions of Rules 4550 by giving "fair and adequate" notice of the facts upon which the
pleader bases the claims as well as the legal theories advanced. 3 ° In
126. Id. at 566.
127. See Sherrod v. Bailey, 580 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Murray v. 0 & A Express, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. 1982)
(pleadings define issues at trial); Texas Dept. of Corrections v. Jackson, 661 S.W.2d 154, 156
(rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (pleadings' function is to define issues
at trial). See generally Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure,39 Sw. L.J. 419 (1985)
(recent survey of Texas civil procedure cases on pleadings).
128. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(2)(b).
129. See, e.g., Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982) (purpose of petition is to
give opposing party facts upon which claim is based); Murray v. 0 & A Express, Inc., 630
S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. 1982) (petition must state facts so adverse party may properly prepare
defense); Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1981) (pleadings
which give fair notice of claim are sufficient). Rules 45 and 47 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure state what must be included in a petition. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 45, 47.
130. See, e.g., Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (rex. 1982) (pleadings sufficient if fair
and adequate notice of facts upon which claim is based are given); Castleberry v. Goosby Bldg.
Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (rex. 1981) (pleadings sufficient if opposing party given fair and
adequate notice); Ghazali v. Southland Corp., 669 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Tex. App.--San Antonio
1984, no writ) (under Rules 45 and 47 pleadings are sufficient if opposing attorney furnished
with fair notice of claim alleged).
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turn, the test for determining whether a pleading gives fair notice to
the opponent is whether an opposing attorney of reasonable competence can ascertain both the nature and basic issues of the controversy, and the testimony relevant to the alleged cause of action. 3 1 In
reviewing the pleadings, the trial court is entitled to view the plead132
ings as a whole to determine whether adequate notice is given.
2.

Prayer for General Relief

In an effort not to waive any potential cause of action, many practitioners resort to the use of a prayer for general relief such as, "for all
relief, both in law and in equity, to which plaintiff may show itself
justly entitled." However, courts have repeatedly ruled that such
prayers cannot create new or alternative causes of action. 133 A good
example of the pitfalls of this type of pleading appear in the supreme
court case of Kissman v. Bendix Home Systems. 134 In that deceptive
trade practices case, the plaintiff pled for the recovery of the market
value of a mobile home.135 However, no testimony regarding the market value of the mobile home was introduced during trial. 136 Instead,
the plaintiff introduced into evidence the cost of repair, which was not
pleaded in the plaintiff's petition.' 37 The supreme court affirmed the
court of appeals' reversal of the trial court's judgment which had
awarded the cost of repair damages. 138 The supreme court ruled that
the prayer for general relief did not help the plaintiff's position because a "prayer must be consistent with the facts stated as a basis for
139
relief."

131. See Schley v. Structural Metals, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 572, 587 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Rodriguez v. Yenawine, 556 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

132. See TEx. R. Cir. P. 45.
133. See, e.g., Kissman v. Bendix Home Sys., 587 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1979) (prayer
must be consistent with facts stated as basis for relief); Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679,
684 (Tex. 1979) (prayer may not enlarge pleading to include entirely different cause of action);
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Nuckols, 666 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, writ

ref'd n.r.e.) (inclusion of request for general relief will not enlarge pleading to include different
cause of action).
134.
135.
136.
137.

587
See
See
See

S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1979).
id. at 676.
id. at 677.
id. at 677.

138. See id at 677-78.
139. Id. at 677.
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Special Exceptions

If a party believes the opponent's pleadings do not meet the standards discussed above, special exceptions may be filed to force the
pleader to bring the pleadings into order.' ° The special exception
must direct the court's attention to the specific pleading excepted to,
and address with particularity the fault in the pleading.' 4 ' For exam-

ple, a special exception which complained that the plaintiff's pleading
was "vague and indefinite and that it did not state a cause of action"

was held not to meet the requirements of Rule 90 since it did not state
with particularity the defects in the pleadings. 142

If a special exception is overruled, no appealable judgment results.
However, if the special exception directed to a plaintiff's pleading is
sustained, an appealable order may result. First, the plaintiff must be
given, as a matter of right, an opportunity to amend his pleading to

cure the complaint. 143 Yet the plaintiff may elect to stand on the
pleading to test the validity of the ruling on appeal.'

The standard

on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in either
striking the pleading or dismissing the cause of action.1 45 In review-

140. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 90, 91.
141. See id. 91; see also Farrar v. Farrar, 620 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (special exception must state defects in petition with particularity).
142. Farrar v. Farrar, 620 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981,
no writ).
143. See, e.g., State v. Houdville Indus., Inc., 632 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1982) (pleading
attacked by special exception should be allowed to amend); Steele v. City of Houston, 603
S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1980) (pleader has right to amend after special exception sustained);
Texas Dept. of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex. 1974) (pleader must be given
opportunity to amend after special exception). The court must allow the pleader a reasonable
time in which to amend. See McCamey v. Kinnear, 484 S.W.2d 150, 152 (rex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. See In re Estate of Mahan, 653 S.W.2d 335, 337 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no
writ) (plaintiff has option to stand on pleading); see also McCamey v. Kinnear, 484 S.W.2d
150, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (plaintiff may stand on pleadings
and test ruling on appeal).
145. See, e.g., Portugal v. Jackson, 647 S.W.2d 393, 394 (rex. App.-Waco 1983, writ
refd n.r.e.) (trial court decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless abuse of discretion);
Wray v. Lenderman, 640 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ) (trial court's broad
discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless showing of abuse of discretion); Farrar v.
Farrar, 620 S.W.2d 801, 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (trial court
will not be overruled unless abuse of discretion). However, a study of the opinions on this
point indicate that appellate courts are quick to reverse cases in which the trial court dismissed
a cause of action for failure to amend. Most often, courts find that the special exceptions were
either too vague or were merely a general demurrer. See, e.g., Huff v. Fidelity Union Life Ins.
Co., 158 Tex. 433, 437, 312 S.W.2d 493, 499 (rex. 1958) (vague special exception nothing
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ing the trial court's ruling, the appellate court must consider the facts
alleged in the pleading as true, and consider all reasonable inferences
that would tend to support the pleading. 146
Special exceptions must be made before the cause of action is submitted to the jury, or in a non-jury case, before judgment is entered. 147
Otherwise, the exception is waived, and no appellate complaint may
be raised. 148 Likewise, if no special exceptions are filed, no complaint
may be heard on appeal. 149 Additionally, the pleadings will thereafter
be construed in favor of the pleader and the judgment. 150
4.

Verified Pleas

Certain pleadings must be verified by an affidavit in order to be
given force and effect.151 The listing of those pleadings may be found
in Rule 93 which contains the usual provision, "any other matter remore than general demurrer); Fariar v. Farrar, 620 S.W.2d 801, 801-02 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (defects in pleadings deemed waived when special exception is waived); McCamey v. Kinnear, 484 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972,
writ refd n.r.e.) (special exception without merit since defects in pleadings not pointed out
with particularity).
146. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. 1965) (court must assume all
alleged material facts are true); Benz-Stoddard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 368 S.W.2d 94,
95 (Tex. 1963) (court must accept allegations in special exception as true); Martine v. Board of
Regents, State Senior Colleges of Texas, 578 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no
writ) (appellate court required to consider facts alleged by plaintiff as true).
147. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 90.
148. See Rio Grande Valley v. Campesi, 580 S.W.2d 850, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 592 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1980). The record must demonstrate both a written special exception and the court's ruling thereon. The exception to this is
in the case of a default judgment where the defendant would obviously have no opportunity to
make such objections. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 90.
149. See, e.g., Central Park Bank v. LeBlanc, 659 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, no writ) (failure to point out defect in petition to court waives error); O'Shea v.
Coronado Transmission Co., 656 S.W.2d 557, 564 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ)
(predicate for complaint on appeal is proper exception filed in trial court); Frankfurt's Texas
Inv. Corp. v. Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 414 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967,
writ refd n.r.e.) (when motion never presented to trial court for determination considered

waived).
150. See, e.g., Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809-10 (Tex. 1982) (petition liberally

construed in favor of pleader when no special exceptions filed); Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1977) (when no special exceptions fied, petition liberally
construed in pleader's favor); Lowther v. Lowther, 578 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (petition liberally construed in pleader's favor and in support of
judgment when special exceptions not fied).
151. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 93.
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quired by statute to be pleaded under oath." '52 As a result, practitioners should frequently check the 16 listings in Rule 93, and also
review any statutory causes of action to ensure pleadings are viable.
A review of the listings in Rule 93 reveals that all the enumerated
pleas are defensive. 5 3 Failure to verify causes the defensive plea to
have no effect, and the subject matter of the plea is waived, both at
trial and appeal.' 54
The verification may be by any person, including both the party or
the attorney.I55 The sworn plea need not be contained in the original
answer, instead, the defendant may amend to supply the verification. 5 6 By the same rule, if the defendant's first answer was verified
and a superseding second amended petition is not, the first verification
does not survive the amendment to preserve the defendant's rights.'"
In some instances, the verification may be upon information and belief
rather than upon personal knowledge.'5 8 However, the best policy is
to verify on personal knowledge if possible. Defects in the verification
must be pointed out precisely by either a written motion or an exception.159 Otherwise any complaints regarding verification are waived
on appeal.
D. Plea in Abatement
The plea in abatement is used to allege facts not evident from the
152. Id. 93(16).
153. See id. 93.
154. See Sunbelt Constr. Corp., Inc. v. S & D Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 668 S.W.2d
415, 418 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
155. However, attorneys should be wary of routinely signing verifications. First, the attorney may well become a witness. Second, if a client demands the attorney to sign and the
attorney honors the request, knowing that the statements are false, the attorney is subject to
professional discipline and contempt of court. See SUPREME COURT OF TExAS, RULES GovERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS art. XII, § 8 (Code of Professional Responsibility) DR 7-

102(A)(4-7) (1984).
156. See Economy Furniture, Inc. v. Jirasek, 345 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
157. See Butler v. Joseph's Wine Shop, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 926, 929-30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
158. Cf. Burke v. Satterfield, 525 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. 1975) (unless authorized by statute, affidavit insufficient unless allegations are direct and unequivocal); Huddlestone v. Western Nat'l Bank, 577 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(generally verification is insufficient if based only on information and belief).
159. See TEx. R. CIV. P. 90; see also Huddlestone v. Western Nat'l Bank, 577 S.W.2d
778, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (defects in verified oath are waived
if not pointed out to judge).
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face of the pleadings which demonstrate reasons why the pleader
should not recover or the case should not go forward. I ° If the plea 6is
sustained, the action is abated until the impediment is removed.' 1
The pleader, however, should be given a reasonable opportunity to
amend the pleadings to remove the impediment. 62 Additionally, the
court, on its own motion, has the power to abate a cause of action if it
becomes aware of facts outside the record which warrant abatement.163 The plea in abatement must clearly enunciate the reason the
case should not proceed; it should also set forth the correct manner in
which the suit should have been brought. 16 The plea in abatement
must be sufficient within itself, and cannot be assisted by allegations in
other pleadings, other than by reference to the cause of action. 165
Furthermore, the plea should state facts and not conclusions of
law.' 66 The burden of proof is upon the movant, and the facts alleged
67
in the plea must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
A plea in abatement must be filed, and a ruling obtained thereon
prior to the trial on the merits of the case. Otherwise, the plea is
waived and may not be presented on appeal.1 68 Additionally, the trial
160. See R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 708, at 159 (rev. ed. 1982).
161. See Augustine v. Nuson, 671 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.]
1984, no writ); Atkinson v. Reid, 625 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no

writ).
162. See Augustine v. Nuson, 671 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1984, no writ); Atkinson v. Reid, 625 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no
writ)
163. See Wheeler v. Employers Mut. Liab. Co., 609 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1980, no writ).
164. See Atkinson v. Reid, 625 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no
writ); see also Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 136 Tex. 5, 10, 133 S.W.2d 767, 771 (1939).

165. See Bryce v. Corpus Christi Area Convention and Tourist Bureau, 569 S.W.2d 496,
499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. See Atkinson v. Reid, 625 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no
writ).
167. See, e.g., Matador Pipelines, Inc. v. Thomas, 650 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff has burden of proof by preponderance of
evidence as to the truthfulness of facts alleged in plea); Atkinson v. Reid, 625 S.W.2d 64, 67
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ) (facts in plea to be proven by preponderance of
evidence); Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980,
no writ) (plea required to be proven by preponderance of evidence).
168. See, e.g., Pullen v. Swanson, 667 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plea in abatement not filed before trial on merits is waived); Garcia v.
Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 622 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ rerd
n.r.e.) (plea in abatement must be ified before trial on merits); Parkview Gen. Hosp., Inc. v.
Waco, 531 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ) (when plea in
abatement is fied it must be urged, or subject to waiver).
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court and appellate court may apply equitable principles in deciding
whether a plea in abatement is filed in a timely manner. 69 In this
regard, courts have held that the purpose of the plea in abatement is
to aid the speedy disposition of litigation on the merits. Therefore, if
a party fails to raise a plea in abatement at an earlier time, the right to
insist on the abatement may be waived. 70 An order overruling a plea
in abatement is interlocutory and is not appealable.1 71 However, unlike venue rulings, the improper refusal to sustain a plea in abatement
may be challenged by a writ of mandamus.1 72 The standard of review
is that of abuse of discretion, and a ruling will not be disturbed on
1 73
appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.
E. Default Judgment
A default judgment may be taken any time after the defendant is
required to answer, provided, however, that the officer's return has
been on file with the clerk of the court ten (10) days, exclusive of the
day of filing and the day of the judgment.1 74 It is imperative that the
rules governing service of citation be strictly followed to avoid the
overturning of a default judgment.
There are no presumptions regarding the validity of the issuance,
service, or return of citation.1 7' The record must affirmatively reflect
strict compliance with the rules.1 76 It should be noted that when serving an agent for a corporation or other entity, the citation must af169. See Develo-Cepts, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 668 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (courts allowed to consider equities of situation in determination of whether plea timely filed); Bluebonnet Farms, Inc. v. Gibralter Say. Ass'n, 618
S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (equity can be
considered when determining whether plea is timely filed).
170. See Bluebonnet Farms, Inc., v. Gibralter Sav. Ass'n, 618 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
171. See Bills v. Braswell, 534 S.W.2d 434, 435 (rex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no
writ).
172. See Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974).
173. See Dolenz v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 620 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. 1981).
174. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 239; see also Gentry v. Gentry, 550 S.W.2d 167, 169-68 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (default judgment granted on day citation was returned and
filed with clerk, was reversed for not allowing required ten days provided by Rules 107 and
239).
175. See Kem v. Krueger, 626 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no
writ).
176. See Encore Builders v. Wells, 636 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1982, no writ).
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firmatively show that the individual served is in fact the agent for
service. Mere allegations of agency are not sufficient. 77 Also, when
serving the secretary of state, the record must reflect not only service
on the secretary of state, but must also show, by certificate or otherwise, that the secretary of state forwarded the petition to the intended
party."7 ' A defective or incomplete sheriff's return may be amended
or corrected to show the true facts of service. 79 The practitioner
should ensure proper service of citation of service so that default victories will not be overturned by an appellate court.
The plaintiff's pleadings must meet certain criteria to support a default judgment. 80 The pleading must inform the court what judgment to render without information from another source. 81 A
petition is generally insufficient only if: (1) the cause of action asserted is not within the court's jurisdiction; (2) it fails to give fair
notice of the asserted claim; or (3) it discloses the invalidity of the
claim on its face. 82
No evidence is necessary to support a default judgment when the
claim is liquidated or supported and proved by an instrument in writing.18 3 The failure to answer is taken as an admission of the petition.184 In contrast, with unliquidated damage claims, evidence of
damages must be presented for a default judgment to stand. 85 If no
record is made of the evidentiary proceedings regarding damages, a
new trial may be necessary to preserve the defendant's right to appel177. See id. at 723.

178. See Roland Communications v. American Communications Corpus Christi, Inc.,
662 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); see also Cars & Concepts,
Inc. v. Funston, 601 S.W.2d 801, 802-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
179. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 118.
180. See id. 90. Rule 90 provides that defects in the petition which are not specifically
objected to are waived; however, this rule does not apply as to any party against whom a
default judgment is rendered. See id. 90.
181. See Roberts v. Roberts, 621 S.W.2d 835, 837-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no

writ).
182. See Wall v. Wall, 630 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ refd
n.r.e.); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 47, 90; accord Village Square Ltd. v. Burton, 660 S.W.2d 556,
559 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
183. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 243.
184. See Village Square Ltd. v. Burton, 660 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1983, writ refd n.r.e.); Blumenthal v. Ameritex Computer Corp., 646 S.W.2d 283, 287 (rex.
App.-Dallas 1983, no writ); Southerland Mower Co. v. Jordan, 587 S.W.2d 215, 217 (rex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
185. Eg. Johnson v. Gisondi, 627 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1981, no writ).
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late review.1 8 6

A default resulting from the failure to answer should not be confused with a post-answer default. A post-answer default occurs when
the defendant has answered, but fails to make an appearance at
trial. 18 7 A post-answer default is not considered an admission or
abandonment of an answer - the plaintiff must still put on evidence
to prove all elements of the cause of action as if the proceeding was a
trial on the merits.1 8
In order to set aside a default judgment, the party against whom
the default judgment was rendered must show: (1) that there was no
negligence or conscious indifference in allowing the default to occur;
(2) a meritorious defense to the cause of action exists; (3) he is willing
to proceed immediately and reimburse the plaintiff for all reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the default; and (4) that overturning
the judgment will not result in delay or injury to the party taking the
default judgment. 9
Affidavits or other evidence may be used to demonstrate these four
requirements. The affidavits should state facts showing the party's
absence of negligence, meritorious defense, and how the overturning
of the judgment will not injure the plaintiff. Mere conclusions to this
effect are insufficient.1 90 The standard of review on appeal from the
ruling on a motion to set aside the default is whether an abuse of
186. See Robinson v.Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. 1972); Houston Pipe Coating
Co., Inc. v. Houston Freightways, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1984, writ refd n.r.e.); Proctor v. Green, 673 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1984, no writ); see also Goodman v. Goodman, 611 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1981, no writ); Looney v. Cribbs, 588 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, no writ).

187. See Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979).
188. See Karl & Kelly Co., Inc. v. Melerran, 646 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Tex. 1983); Stoner v.
Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979); Conrad v. Orellana, 661 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
189. See Butler v. Dal Tex Mach. & Tool Co., 627 S.W.2d 258, 259-60 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1982, no writ); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 617 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). In Butler, the court held that the defendant was negligent and

consciously indifferent when he testified that he did not understand the citation, put the papers
on his desk, and did nothing further until he received notice of the default judgment. See
Butler v. Dal Tex Mach. & Tool Co., 627 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no
writ).
190. See Guaranty Bank v. Thompson, 632 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. 1982); see also Texas
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Martinez, 658 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983,
writ refd n.r.e.).
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discretion has occurred.1 91
F. Separate Trials, Severance, and Consolidation
Naturally, the joinder and severance of lawsuits create similar
problems, and the courts have developed similar ways in which to
deal with those problems. At the outset, it is important for practitioners to understand the difference between severance and separate trials
so that appropriate tactics may be taken to protect the record.
Severance is possible only in cases where a lawsuit involves two or
more separate and distinct causes of action. In other words, each of
the causes of action in the lawsuit must be such that it could be tried
in a separate lawsuit as if it were the only claim in controversy.192 In
contrast, the court can order a separate trial of issues which would
not necessarily create an independent cause of action. 193 The lesson is
simple. Severance divides the lawsuit into two or more independent
causes, each of which terminates in a separate and final enforceable
judgment. 94 On the other hand, a separation of the cause of action
for trial simply results in the trial of two issues in the same lawsuit,
and results in one final judgment. An order granting or denying severance or separate trials is interlocutory and is, therefore, not appealable. ' 95 The standard on appeal is abuse of discretion, and an order
granting or denying a separate trial or a severance 96will not be disturbed on appeal without a clear showing of abuse.1
191. See HST Gathering Co. v. Motor Services, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); Loewer v. Flanagan Forms, 661 S.W.2d 751, 752-53 (Tex.

App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ); Butler v. Dal Tex Mach. & Tool Co., 627 S.W.2d 258, 259
(Tex App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
192. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Fouderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982); Kansas
Univ. Endowment Ass'n v. King, 162 Tex. 599, 601, 350 S.W.2d 9, 11 (1961); Vautrain v.
Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd); see also TEx. R.

Civ. P. 41.
193. See Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass'n v. King, 162 Tex. 599, 601, 350 S.W.2d 9, 11
(1961); Vautrain v. Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd).
194. See Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass'n v. King, 162 Tex. 599, 601, 350 S.W.2d 9,11

(1961); Vautrain v. Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ
dism'd).
195. See Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass'n v. King, 162 Tex. 599, 601, 350 S.W.2d 9, 11
(1961); Vautrain v. Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ
dism'd).
196. See Hall v. City of Austin, 450 S.W.2d 836, 837-38 (Tex. 1970); Barrows v. Ezer,
624 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Nolan v. Bettis,
562 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

33

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 2, Art. 2

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:273

Commonly, severances are granted when cross-actions are filed. In

many instances, the plaintiff on the cross-action makes a mistake in
failing to have service of process issued to the cross-defendant after a
severance occurs. Practitioners should remember that once a severance is accomplished, a new and independent cause of action exists,

and may well necessitate service of process so that the court may obtain personal jurisdiction over the cross-defendant. 19 7 A failure to
make adequate service of process will result in the court losing juris1 98
diction over the severed defendant.
Consolidation operates much like a motion for separate trials.
Consolidation is proper on cases involving a common question of law
or fact pending before the court. 199 Orders denying consolidation are
interlocutory and are within the sole discretion of the court. 2 °°
G.

Intervention and Third Party Practice
1. Intervention

Rule 60 allows a party to intervene in an existing cause of action
and assert legal or equitable claims, subject to being stricken by the
court for sufficient cause on the motion of any party.2 "' The obvious
purpose of Rule 60 is to avoid the multiplicity of suits. 20 2 Once a
motion to strike is filed, the burden of proof is upon the intervenor to

show a legal or equitable interest in the lawsuit. 20 3 The motion to
strike or motion to dismiss must not only be filed, but it also must be

197. See Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex. 1984); Allison v.
Arkansas - Louisiana Gas Co., 624 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1981); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 624
S.W.2d 800, 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
198. See McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); Lane Wood Indus., Inc. v.
DeVloss, 489 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no writ); United States Leasing
Corp. v. Centennial Liquor Stores, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963,

no writ).
199. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 174.
200. See Allison v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 624 S.W.2d 566, 568 (rex. 1981); Stevenson v. Reese, 593 S.W.2d 828, 830 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Kemp v. Harrison, 431 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968,
writ refd n.r.e.).
201. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 60.
202. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Rohn, 586 S.W.2d 701, 703 (rex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, no writ); see also Mulcahy v. Houston Steel Drum Co., 402 S.W.2d 817, 819 (rex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1966, no writ).
203. See Mendez v. Bower, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. 1982); see also St. Paul Ins. Co. v.
Rohn, 586 S.W.2d 701, 703 (rex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
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brought to the court's attention for a ruling.2 If the record does not
reflect both a motion and ruling, any error on appeal is waived. 205
Rule 60 does not establish a time limit for either an intervention or a
motion to strike. 206 However, the court through its equitable power
may consider the tardiness of either action and rule accordingly.20 7
Nonetheless, an intervention may not be permitted after a judgment is
rendered, even if the intervention is made within the thirty-day period
after the judgment is entered when the court retains absolute plenary
power over the judgment. °8
An order granting intervention is interlocutory and is not appealable until a final judgment is rendered.' 9 The decision to strike an
intervention rests in the discretion of the trial court, and the standard
on appeal is abuse of discretion.21 °
2. Third Party Claims
Rule 38 allows any party to file claims against third parties who
may be liable for any or all parts of the claims asserted in the cause of
action. 211 A defendant may bring third parties into the suit without
leave of court if a third party petition is filed not later than thirty (30)
days after the original answer. Otherwise, the defendant must obtain
leave of court on motion with notice to all parties to the action.21 2
The motion should contain sufficient proof to connect the cause of
action against the third party to the original cause of action.21 3 To
204. See Helton v. Kimball, 621 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no
writ).
205. See Jones v. Springs Ranch, 642 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no
writ); see also Tax. R. Civ. P. 60.
206. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 60.
207. See Armstrong v. Tidelands Life Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1971, no writ).
208. See First Allied Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1984); Carnal Co. Pural High School v. Nelson, 158 Tex. 564, 566, 314 S.W.2d 956, 957 (1958); Helton v. Kimball, 621 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
209. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Texas, 615 S.W.2d 947, 952
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), writ ref'd per curam, 622 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. 1981).
210. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Rahn, 586 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi
1979, no writ); Rogers v. Searle, 533 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976,
no writ); Armstrong v. Tidelands Life Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1971, no writ).
211. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 38.
212. See id. 38.
213. See Keller v. Judd, 671 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ);
see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 38.
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protect the record, caution must be used to ensure that the record
reflects not only that the motion is filed, but also, that the request is
denied.214 A factor considered by the court in allowing motions for
leave to file third party complaints is the timeliness of the request.213
As a result, the motion should disclose when the movant became
aware that a third party complaint was necessary. The motion should
also indicate the additional expense if the third party claim was pursued in a separate cause of action.
The decision to allow the joinder of a third party rests in the court's
discretion, and reversible error will not result unless there is an abuse
of discretion.216 The decision to allow a joinder of a third party is
interlocutory, and no appeal lies until a final judgment is entered.217
H. Motion for Continuance
The granting and denying of motions for continuance are seldom
reversed on appeal. However, of those complaints which do see appellate review, most are decided on the grounds that the record was
not adequately protected and that the rules of civil procedure relating
to motions for continuance were not followed.21 8 The general rule is
that a court will not have abused its discretion if the motion for continuance does not conform to the rules.21 9
All motions for continuance must be verified or supported by an
affidavit. 22° The burden of proof is on the party moving for the con214. See Toombs v. Coates, 596 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1980, no writ).
215. See Threeway Constructors, Inc. v. Aten, 659 S.W.2d 700, 701-02 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1983, no writ).
216. See Allison v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 624 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1981); Keller
v. Judd, 671 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); Threeway Constructors, Inc. v. Aten, 659 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
217. See Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
218. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 251, 252, 253, 254. For an example of a case which indicates
problems with failing to follow the rules, see City of Houston v.Blackbird, 658 S.W.2d 269, 272
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
219. See Garcia v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 622 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Commings, 618 S.W.2d 883,
885-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Watson v. Godwin, 425 S.W.2d
424, 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
220. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 251; see also City of Houston v. Blackbird, 658 S.W.2d 269, 272
(Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1983, no writ); Watkins v. Douglass, 614 S.W.2d 892, 896
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, error dism'd).
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tinuance. 221 The record must show that the motion for continuance
was filed, and that it was formally presented to the court for a hearing. 222 In fact, the trial court has no duty to call a motion for continuance to hearing.22 3 As a result, if the statement of facts and
transcript do not reflect that the court ruled on the motion, the appellate court must presume that the motion was properly overruled.22 4
1. Lack of Testimony
If the grounds for a continuance is lack of testimony, the movant
must file an affidavit stating that: the testimony is material, the due
diligence in procuring the testimony, the reasons for failure to obtain
the testimony, and a statement that the testimony cannot be procured
from any other source. 225 The due diligence used must be fully explained, as mere conclusions to that effect are insufficient.226 If the
motion fails to itemize the specific efforts of counsel to obtain the testimony, the refusal to grant a continuance will not be considered an
abuse of discretion. 227 Due diligence has proven to be a difficult term
for the courts to define. Whether a party used due diligence is decided on a case-by-case basis. For example, due diligence in procuring testimony, has been defined as, "the issuance and service of the
subpoena in a sufficiently reasonable time before trial to enable a wit' '228
ness to appear or by taking depositions under such circumstances.
Likewise, another court found failure to use due diligence when a
party had made no effort to obtain testimony of a witness during a
221. See Hutt v. City of Roark Springs, 552 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1970, writ refd n.r.e.).
222. See id. at 586.
223. See Guidry v. Massey, 572 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1978, no writ).
224. See Brown v. Crockett, 601 S.W.2d 188, 190 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no
writ); see also Men's Warehouse v. Helms, 682 S.W.2d 429, 430-31 (rex. App.-Houston (1st
Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
225. See TEx. R. CiV. P. 252. However, if the motion for continuance is the first filed in
the case, it is not necessary to aver that the testimony could not be procured elsewhere. See
Alexander v. Alexander, 540 S.W.2d 502, 503 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ dism'd).
226. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 252; see also Ray v. Ray, 542 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
227. See TEx. R. Cxv. P. 252; see also Ray v. Ray, 542 S.W.2d 209, 212 (rex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
228. J. C. Penney & Co. v. Duran, 479 S.W.2d 374, 380 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Fritsch v. J. M. English Truck Line, 151 Tex. 168, 170, 246
S.W.2d 856, 858 (1952); A. C. Swift & Sons Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Sam Sanders, Inc.,
405 S.W.2d 402, 403-04 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, no writ).
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three-month period after the other party had amended his pleadings. 229 Finally, if the court finds that the absent testimony could be
provided by other witnesses or from other means, it is not an abuse of
230
discretion to overrule the motion for continuance.
2. Absence of a Witness
If the ground for continuance is the absence of a witness, the movant must state the name and residence of the witness, what the testimony of the witness will provide, that the testimony cannot be
procured from another source, and that the continuance is not sought
for delay only, but so that justice will be done. 2 31 However, the mere

absence of a material witness does not entitle the movant to a continuance. The party must show not only reasonable excuse for the absence, but that the testimony is material and would be admissible
under the pleadings.232 In many instances the trial court is reluctant
to grant a continuance if no attempt has been made to take the witnesses' depositions, and denials of motions on these grounds are generally upheld.233 Rule 252, however, provides that the failure to
obtain a deposition of any witness residing within one hundred miles
of the courthouse in the county in which the suit is pending shall not
be regarded as a want of diligence when diligence has otherwise been
used to secure personal attendance of the witness at trial. 234
3. Absence of Counsel
As a general rule, absence of counsel is not good cause for a continuance or postponement of a trial. 235 The court, however, in its discretion, can allow a continuance upon cause shown or "upon matters
229. See First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo v. Bauert, 622 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1981, no writ).
230. See Jones v. Johns Community Hosp., 624 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1981, no writ).
231. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 252.
232. See Brown v. Brown, 599 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980,
no writ); Middleton v. Vaughn, 530 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ);
Erback v. Donald, 170 S.W.2d 289, 291-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1943, writ reed
n.r.e.).
233. See Jones v. Johns Community Hosp., 624 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1981, no writ); see also Green v. State, 589 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no
writ).
234. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 252.
235. See id. 253; see also Gendebien v. Gendebien, 668 S.W.2d 905, 907-08 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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within the knowledge or information of the judge," both of which
must be documented on the record.23 6 As a result, it is important that
any motion for continuance based on absence of counsel contain adequate verification of why the attorney cannot attend the trial. Almost
all the cases reported on absence of counsel are cases in which continuances were denied. For example, it has been held not to be an abuse
of discretion to deny a motion for continuance where the primary attorney has prepared the case, but only another attorney is available to
try the case.237 Furthermore, it is not an abuse of discretion for a
court to overrule a motion for continuance where the attorney of record is unavailable to attend, but the attorney who appeared for the
motion for continuance has adequate time to prepare for trial.238 In
any event, in determining whether the court abused its discretion in
overruling a continuance, the appellate court is entitled to view the
entire record to determine whether the party was adequately represented at trial.23 9
4. Attendance at Legislature
A mandatory continuance must issue for any attorney or party who
is a member of the legislature and who will be or is in actual attendance at a session of the legislature. 2 ° The continuance must be
granted at any time within thirty (30) days of the date when the legislature is to be in session. 241 However, if the grounds for the continuance is that an attorney is a member of the legislature, that attorney
must file an affidavit containing a declaration that, "it is his intention
to participate actively in the preparation and/or presentation of the

236. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 253.
237. See Manufactured Hous. Mgt. Corp. v. Tubb, 643 S.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Tex. App.Waco 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. v. Cummings, 618 S.W.2d 883, 885
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
238. See Dover Corp. v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
239. See id. at 766. While this rule makes good common sense, it can lead to a ridiculous
result. If the substituted counsel believes the denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion,
the best tactic seems to be to provide ineffective counsel. No serious lawyer would consider

such a course of action.
240. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 254; see also TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon
Supp. 1985).
241. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 254; see also TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon
Supp. 1985).
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case." 24' 2 Article 2168a provides that the affidavit need not be corroborated, and the affidavit cannot be contested.24 3 The continuance
shall last until thirty (30) days after the adjournment of the legislature
and cannot be charged against the party receiving the continuance on
any subsequent application for continuance. 2 " However, there are
two exceptions to this mandatory continuance. Article 2168a provides that a continuance will not issue as a matter of right if it is
shown that the attorney was employed within ten days of the setting
date.245 In that event, the continuance shall be discretionary with the
court.246 Additionally, the continuance may not issue in hearings on
temporary restraining orders.247
I. Discovery
The purpose of discovery is to obtain the fullest knowledge of the
facts and issues prior to trial, and as a result, the rules pertaining to
discovery are liberally construed.2 4 The trial court has great latitude
in discovery, and its rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. 24 9 The same standard applies when the court enters orders
for discovery abuse or failure to answer discovery.250 The harmless
242. See
Supp. 1985).
243. See
244. See
Supp. 1985).
245. See
Supp. 1985).
246. See
Supp. 1985).

TEX. R. Civ. P. 254; see also TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon Supp. 1985).
TEX. R. Civ. P. 254; see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon
TEX. R. Civ. P. 254; see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon
TEX. R. Civ. P. 254; see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon

247. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 254; see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon

Supp. 1985); Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. 1977); Condovest Corp. v. John
Street Bldg., Inc., 662 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
248. See West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1978) (except for privileged material,
discovery aimed at fully informing both sides); Martinez v. Rutledge, 592 S.W.2d 398, 399
(rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discovery allows parties to obtain information
on case before trial). See generally Barrow & Henderson, 1984 Amendments to the Texas
Rules of Civil ProcedureAffecting Discovery, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 713 (1984) (identification and
interpretation of changes in rules); Comment, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Prescriptionsto Ease the Pain, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 887, 895 (1984) (amendments to federal discovery rules aimed at reducing abuse).
249. See Martinez v. Rutledge, 592 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ
refd n.r.e.); The Young Companies, Inc. v. Bayou Corp., 545 S.W.2d 901, 903 (rex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ). See generally Sales, Pre-TrialDiscovery in Texas, 31 Sw. L.J.
1017 (1977) (general discussion of discovery and confusion arising from some of the rules).
250. See Jarrett v. Warhola, 695 S.W.2d 8, 9-10 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.]
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error rule applies to all appeals of discovery orders, and the complainant must demonstrate that the court's order was calculated to, and
probably did, cause rendition of an improper judgment.251 A slightly
different standard applies for writs of mandamus. Instead, a pure
abuse of discretion is for Admissions
Rule 169 provides that request for admissions will be deemed admitted unless an answer is filed within thirty (30) days. 25 3 The
deemed admission occurs without the necessity of a court order.254 If
the respondent seeks to avoid the harshness of this rule, it must apply
to the court and show legal or equitable excuses to avoid the deemed
1985, no writ) (court authorized to dismiss case when discovery orders were violated); see also
Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. 1984) (failure to impose sanctions
for discovery violation not abuse of discretion); Buchmeyer, Discovery Abuse and The Time
Out Rule, TEX. B.J. 276 (Feb. 1983) (discretion exemplified when judge creates new discovery
rule). For a comprehensive discussion of discovery rules and sanctions, see Kilgarlin & Jackson, Sanctionsfor Discovery Abuse Under New Rule 215, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 767 (1984).
251. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woody, 640 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (trial court quashed taking of deposition - did not cause improper judgment); Sneed v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 569 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court's judgment proper even though discovery
was somewhat restrictive); Bounds v. Caudle, 549 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi), rev'd on other grounds, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977) (party's request to discover names
of witnesses was denied); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 434 (trial court's decision will not be reversed unless error caused improper judgment).
252. See Peeples v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 13, 14 (Oct. 19, 1985)
(judge did not abuse discretion, therefore, court of appeals had no jurisdiction to issue writ of
mandamus).
253. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 169; see also Overstreet v. Home Indem. Co., 669 S.W.2d 825,
828 (Tex. App.-Dallas) (request for admissions admitted when no answers were filed within
stated time), rev'd on other grounds; 678 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1984). See generally Bush, Rule
169: An Overview, 44 TEX. B.J. 1049 (1981).
254. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Bragg, 670 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (insurer's answers were late and worker's request for
admissions deemed admitted without motion); Packer v. First Texas Sav. Ass'n of Dallas, 567
S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (party who failed to answer
may fie motion to request that admissions not be admitted, but party seeking admissions
under no obligation to file motion to have them admitted).
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admissions.2 5 A deemed admission is generally considered a judicial
admission that is binding on the answering party. However, it is discretionary with the court whether to allow the withdrawal or amendment of answers to a request for admissions.25 6 The ruling of the trial
court on such a motion will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.257 In order to preserve error for appeal when the court fails
to grant a leave to file late answers to request for admissions, the complainant must have filed a motion to request permission to file answers
and obtain a ruling thereon.25 8 The motion should recite the reasons
that the responses were not timely filed, and a copy of the proposed
responses should be attached. Generally, if answers to requests for
admissions are filed, but there is a defect in or an omission of the
verification, the court should allow amendments after a proper mo-

tion. 25 9 Additionally, Rule 169 provides that the court may permit
the withdrawal or amendment of an admission when the presentation
of the merits will be served thereby. 260 The party seeking the amend-

255. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Bragg, 670 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mathes v. Kelton, 565 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1977), aff'd, 569 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1978); Burnett v. Cory Corp., 352 S.W.2d 502,
506-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ refd n.r.e.).
256. See Reyes v. International Metals Supply Co., 666 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (courts generally allow amendments to answers when only
problem is verification defect); Durrett v. Boger, 234 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, no writ) (courts may enlarge time periods if extension requested before original
time period had expired and where party requesting extension has good cause); see also TEX.
R. Civ. P. 169. Subsection 2 of Rule 169 states in part: "[t]he court may permit withdrawal
or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and
the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment
will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits." Id. 169(2).
257. See Reyes v. International Metals Supply Co., 666 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ); Firestone Photographs v. Lamaster, 567 S.W.2d 273, 277
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ); see also Kilgarlin & Jackson, SanctionsforDiscovery Abuse Under New Rule 215, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 767, 768-69 (1984) (imposition of discovery sanctions within trial court discretion); Comment, Imposition and Selection of Sanctions in
Texas PretrialDiscovery Procedure, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 191, 193 (1979) (trial court's sanctions for discovery abuse not reversible unless discretion is abused).
258. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Bragg, 670 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mathes v. Kelton, 565 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1977), aff'd, 569 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1978); Hill v. Caparino, 370 S.W.2d 760, 761
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, no writ) (request for admissions deemed admitted and plaintiff's failure to file motion to permit late filing prevents him from complaining on appeal).
259. See Reyes v. International Metals Supply Co., 666 S.W.2d 622, 624-25 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ); see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 169(2). Subsection 2 contains the
phrase "[t]he court may permit withdrawal or amendment...." Id. 169(2) (emphasis added).
260. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 169(2).
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ment or withdrawal must demonstrate that the requested action will
not prejudice the party who obtained the admission.261
2.

Experts

Rule 166 provides that the identity of an expert may be obtained if
the expert is one who may be called as a witness.262 Also, the subject
matter on which the expert may testify, the opinions held, and the
facts known to the expert are also discoverable. 263 Likewise, the same
information must be disclosed even if the expert is used for consultation, if the work product of such expert forms any basis of the opinion
of an expert who is called to testify. 26 In other words, to shelter an
expert from discovery, a party must aver that the expert will not be
used for testimony and will also not be used in the furtherance of
another expert's opinion.265 If a party is unsure whether an expert
will be called at trial, that expert must be disclosed.266 Due to the
harshness of this rule, the decision as to the specific time to require a
party to state that an expert will not be a witness is left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.2 67 However, case law makes it clear that
a party must be given a reasonable time to investigate the case so that
an intelligent designation of experts may be made.268 In any event,
261. See id. 169(2).
262. See id. 166b(2)(e)(1).
263. See id. 166b(2)(e)(1).
264. See id. 166b(2)(e)(1); see also Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Tex. 1977). In
Barker,the supreme court held that: "Where a party does not positively aver that the expert in
question will be 'used solely for consultation' and will not be called as a witness... the policy
of allowing broad discovery in civil cases is furthered by permitting discovery of that expert's
reports, factual observations, and opinions." Id. at 44; see also Crowe v. Smith, 679 S.W.2d
22, 23 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ) (expert's opinion discoverable if he is
not used solely for consultation or if it is possible he might testify).
265. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(e)(l).
266. See Crowe v. Smith, 679 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no
writ) (must be clear that witness will be used solely for consultation to justify withholding him
from other side); see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(e).
267. See Werner v. Miller, 579 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1979) (trial judges have discretion
because they are "in the best position to supervise the progress of the case"); see also Jones &
Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Schattman, 667 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no
writ) (trial court best to determine when parties have had enough time to investigate the case
and decide on experts).
268. See Werner v. Miller, 579 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1979). If parties were forced to
designate experts before they had time to thoroughly investigate, the chances of furnishing
expert witnesses and adverse theories to the other side would greatly increase. See id. at 456.
Further, it would not be fair to allow one side to benefit from the other side's thorough preparation. See id at 456; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Schattman, 667 S.W.2d 352, 354-
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the designation of the expert must occur not less than thirty (30) days
prior to the beginning of the trial except on leave of the court. 69
Therefore, if a proper request for designation of experts has been
made, and no response made as to a particular expert, the expert will
not be permitted to testify unless the proponent obtains leave of the
court and demonstrates good cause for allowing the testimony.27 °
The term "good cause" is not defined in the rules and is decided on a
2 71
case-by-case basis.

In these expert disclosure situations, it is important that the respondent properly protect the record. If the basis for the objection to the
undisclosed testimony is surprise, the respondent should move for a
continuance.272 In Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft,273 the supreme court
held, "the failure to present a motion to continue or postpone the trial
severely undermines the assertion that the trial court abused its discretion [in allowing an undisclosed expert to testify].

' 274

The current

case law gives the trial court great discretion in whether to exclude or
allow expert testimony when the Rule 166 designated rules have not
been followed. 275 As a result, "an inconsistent body of law has developed as to when to permit such testimony [of the nondesignated ex-

56 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ). In Schattman, the defendant was not forced to
designate an employee as a consultant or an expert until one year after defendant had plaintiff
expert's report. See id. at 355. The court held this was a reasonable time to investigate the
case and designate experts. See id. at 355.
269. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(5).
270. See id. 166b(5), 215(5).
271. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Garza, 675 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court permitted expert to testify even though other side was not
informed until five days before trial); see also National Say. Corp. v. Rushing, 628 S.W.2d 90,
92-94 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ) (expert allowed to testify even though adverse
party was not informed until voir dire). See generally Kilgarlin, "hat To Do With The Unidentified Expert? 48 TEX B.J. 1192, 1194-96 (1985) (discussing several cases finding good
cause).
272. See, e.g., Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. 1984) (when
expert's identity was revealed during trial, trial court did not abuse discretion by allowing
expert to testify when appellant failed to ask for a continuance); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v.
Garza, 675 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ reed n.r.e.) (party
claiming ambush or surprise because of newly identified expert can always ask for continuance); National Sur. Corp. v. Rushing, 628 S.W.2d 90, 91-92 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1981, no
writ) (appellant's refusal of court's offer to recess to depose new expert and failure to ask for
continuance prevented him from complaining on appeal).
273. 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. 1984).
274. Id. at 443.
275. See Kilgarlin, What To Do With The UnidentifiedExpert? 48 TEX. B.J. 1192 (1985).
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pert]. '27 6 The best discussion of this dilemma is Justice Kilgarlin's
recent Texas Bar Journal article entitled "What To Do With An Unidentified Expert."2'7 7 Recently the supreme court had an opportunity
to provide specific guidelines for allowing testimony by non-designated witnesses. The court however avoided any thorough analysis of
disclosure requirements since the proponent of the witness failed to
show good cause under Rule 168(7).278

3. Protecting Claims of Privilege and other Exemptions
from Discovery
Rule 166d(3) provides the categories that are exempt from discovery.2 79 The burden of justifying an exemption is on the party claiming
that exemption. 28 0 In Peeples v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 281 the
supreme court stated that when a party seeks to exclude documents or
any other evidence in the discovery process, it has the affirmative duty
to follow several specific guidelines. First, it must plead the particular
privilege or immunity claimed.2 82 Second, it must request a hearing
on the motion.283 Third, the trial court must determine whether an in
camera inspection of the material is necessary. 284 If an in camera inspection is necessary, the party must segregate the materials for which
the privilege or immunity is sought from the other non-privileged information. 285 Failure to follow any of these steps constitutes a waiver
276. Id. at 1192.
277. Id. at 1192.
278. See Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement and Nursing Center, Inc., 29 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J.103, 104 (Dec. 14, 1985). This case dealt with the failure to disclose a fact witness. The
record indicated the proponent of the witness failed to list her in a response to timely filed
interrogatories. Thereafter, the proponent learned of the witness' existence well before trial;
but, still refused to designate her as a witness. The court found that the record lacked any
evidence of good cause for this failure to designate the potential witness. As a result, she was
not allowed to testify. See id. at 104-05.
279. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(3). The categories exempt from discovery include: (1) an
attorney's work product; (2) written statements of parties and potential witnesses; (3) experts'
opinions when he will not testify; (4) experts' documents if they will not help form a basis for a
testifying expert's opinion; (5) any communication after filing of suit between parties, representatives, agents, and employees when it pertains to the case; and (6) anything protected by
privilege. See id. 166b(3).
280. See Peeples v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.13 (Oct. 16, 1985).
281. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.13 (Oct. 16, 1985).
282. See id. at 14.
283. See id. at 14.
284. See id at 14.
285. See id at 14.
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of any complaint of the trial court's action on appeal. 2 6
4.

Mandamus

Since the landmark case of Crane v. Tunks, 2 7 discovery matters
have been reviewable by writ of mandamus rather than a regular appeal of a final judgment. 28" The reason for mandamus is clear. In
many cases, awaiting a trial on the merits on appeal would render any
discovery order academic. 289 As a result, the shorter mandamus procedure is preferable.29°
The standard of review on mandamus is a confusing one. An order
291
of mandamus will not issue to control the trial court's discretion;
however, a writ of mandamus will issue to correct an abuse of discretion.292 Mandamus became a frequently used tool when in 1983, the
legislature granted the courts of appeal full power to grant writs of
mandamus.293 This amendment radically changed mandamus prac286. See id. at 14. However, this decision should be read with the original opinion in the
case. See Peeples v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 539 (July 3, 1985), opinion
withdrawn, 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 13 '(Oct. 16, 1985). In that opinion, Justice Wallace included
another procedural step which required the party requesting the discovery to produce all the
material for which a privilege was claimed to the court and request an in camera inspection.
The supreme court was wise to withdraw the original opinion. Under the first opinion, the
trial court was required to review the alleged privileged documents in camera on each discovery dispute. The result would have been backlogged courts and the review of copied records.
This author believes that the new procedure is workable and easy to follow.
287. 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1959).
288. See id. at 184, 328 S.W.2d at 437. Actually, another case, Barker v. Dunham, 515
S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977), allowed this practice in later years. In both cases, the supreme court
ruled that while the district court's order was not appealable, delay would make the issue
"academic," and any objections would be moot; therefore, mandamus would lie.
289. See generally Sales & Cliff, Jurisdiction in the Texas Supreme Court and Courts of
Civil Appeals, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 501, 523 (1974) (discussion of court's jurisdiction in reference to writ of mandamus); Comment, The Expanding Use of Mandamus to Review Texas
District CourtDiscovery Order An Immediate Appeal is Available, 32 Sw. L.J. 1283 (1978-79)
(general discussion of mandamus and Texas supreme court expanded authority to issue writs).
290. See Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977); see also Melton v. Lattimore,
667 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
291. See TEx. GovT. CODE ANN. §§ 22.002, 22.221 (Vernon 1986).
292. See, e.g., Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Tex. 1977) (while general rule is
recognized, question here was whether discretion was abused); Houdrille Indus., Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. 1973) (supreme court can grant relief in writ of mandamus when trial judge went beyond authority); Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.
1962) (discretion abused when complete income tax returns ordered discovered).
293. See TEX. GovT. CODE ANN. § 22.221 (Vernon 1986) (courts of appeal have authority to issue writs of mandamus against any county or district court judge); see also Jones v.
Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Schattman, 667 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no
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tice in Texas, and although not required by the rules, the supreme
court generally requires that any writs of mandamus on discovery
matters be first directed to the courts of appeal.294 In fact, motions
for leave to file a writ of mandamus in the supreme court must state
the date the motion was first presented to the court of appeals or a
compelling reason why the motion was not first presented to the court
of appeals. 29" Nonetheless, the supreme court maintains the right to
grant a writ of mandamus without hearing or argument where the
action or order of the respondent is contrary to the Texas Constitution, statutes, rules, or is in conflict with a previous opinion of the
supreme court.296
J. Summary Judgment
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to permit either
party to obtain a prompt disposition of a case involving "unmeritorious claims or untenable defenses," without the necessity of a complete
trial.297 Although the summary judgment procedure has been a part
of the rules of procedure for years, it fell into disuse because of frequent reversals of summary judgments by appellate courts.298 As a
result, the supreme court amended Rule 166-A in 1978 to ensure that
more cases were disposed of in a summary procedure. 299 Nevertheless, appellate courts still reverse summary judgments with alarming
writ) (writ of mandamus proper for appellate court to issue when trial court clearly abuses
discretion in discovery proceedings); Menton v. Lattimore, 667 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1984, no writ) (appellate courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus).
294. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Schattman, 667 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1984, no writ); see also Menton v. Lattimore, 667 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1984, no writ).
295. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Clark, 665 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no
writ) (supreme court will generally not accept mandamus prior to appellate court); see also
TEX. R. Civ. P. 474 (when an appellate court has concurrent jurisdiction with supreme court
over original proceedings, motions should be filed with lower courts first).
296. See Lindsey v. O'Neill, 689 S.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Tex. 1985); Griffin v. Smith, 688
S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. 1985); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 483.
297. See, e.g., In re Price's Estate, 375 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tex. 1964); Gulberkian v. Penn,
151 Tex. 412, 415, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1952); Webb v. Eledge, 678 S.W.2d 259, 261
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
298. See Sheehan, Summary Judgment" Let Movant Beware, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 253, 254
(1976). According to Mr. Sheehan's research, during the eight year period from 1968-1976,
the Texas Supreme Court granted writs of error in 97 cases where the trial court had entered a
summary judgment. See id at 254. Over seventy percent of these summary judgments were
eventually overturned by the court as improperly granted. See id. at 254.
299. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A. For a good discussion of the rule changes and their
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frequency. Many of the reversals can be attributed to the fact that the
records are not protected or the motions and evidence were badly
handled. 3ao A few precautions will increase the odds of successful
motions for summary judgments.
1. Requisites of Motion
The motion for summary judgment must state the specific grounds
upon which judgment is sought.30 1 The grounds are sufficiently specific if the motion gives "fair notice" to the respondent.3 0 2 The
grounds relied upon must entitle the movant to judgment as a matter
of law. 03 However, the mere fact that the motion is uncontrovered
does not carry this burden; as even uncontroverted evidence may raise
a fact issue. 3° t Rule 166-A provides that a motion may be filed, "at
any time after the adverse party has appeared or answered. ' 3 5 While
most cases involve a formal answer, some actions that fall short may
be deemed an appearance, and a motion for summary judgment is
appropriate thereafter.30 6 Furthermore, a defendant may move for a
intended effect, see City of Houston v.Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.
1979).
300. Cf Gemis, Reasonsfor Case Reversal in Texas: An Analysis, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 299,
308-310 & Chart A (1985).
301. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A; see also Rutherford v. Whataburger, 601 S.W.2d 441,
443 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (summary judgment not sustainable on
ground not set forth in motion). But see Albritton v. Henry S. Miller Co., 608 S.W.2d 693, 695
(Tex.Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (issues "expressly presented" by all evidence
presented to and considered by the court in summary judgment motion; issues need not be set
forth specifically in motion).
302. See Thomas v. Cisneros, 596 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). However, if the respondent does not complain of the lack of specificity in a written response, the ground is waived on appeal. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 576
S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. 1978); Silva v. Wilson, 617 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1981, no writ); Jones v. McSpadden, 560 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no
writ).
303. See Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970); Davis v.
Houston Indep. School Dist., 654 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no
writ); Texas Bank & Trust v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 565 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1978, no writ).
304. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A.
305. See Troth v. City of Dallas, 667 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
306. See supra Section 1.2. on special appearances for examples of what type of conduct
can be considered an appearance. Coversely, the actual fling of a motion for summary judgment by the defendant personally constitutes an appearance. See 4 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS
CIVIL PRACTICE § 17.26.4, at 169 (rev. ed. 1981).
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summary judgment on a counterclaim at any time even when no answer or other formal reply has been filed, provided the plaintiff has
appeared on the claim. 0 7 Other than the previously mentioned specificity requirement, Rule 166-A does not demand any additional requisites in the formal motion. 0 Indeed, the motion itself need not be
verified. 30 9 Affidavits and other summary judgment proof, however,
must survive strict scrutiny, and not only must be verified, but must
contain averments that would be admissible into evidence.3 0
2.

Affidavits and Summary Judgment Proof

A whole body of rules of procedure and common law have developed surrounding the use of affidavits and other summary judgment

proof. Rule 166-A(e) provides that "the supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, and shall set forth such

facts as would be admissible into evidence." ' The affidavit should
also show that the affiant is competent to testify.312 In other words,
the face of the affidavit should demonstrate that the affiant has no
competency problems.31 3 For example, if expert testimony is used, an
adequate predicate of qualification should be included in the affidavit.
307. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(a); Brown v. Owens, 663 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1983), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 S.W.2d 748
(Tex. 1984); Perry v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 492 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1972, no writ).
308. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(b); 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 17.26.4,
at 169 (rev. ed. 1981).
309. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
310. See Shead v. Grissett, 566 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1978, writ dism'd); Statford v. Smith, 458 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1970, no writ); Perry v. Little, 377 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). In fact, many motions for summary judgments cannot be verified (such as motions based on statutes of limitations, as they rely on allegations in the respondent's pleadings).
311. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e); see also Jackson T. Fulgham Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title
Guar. Co., 649 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ refd n.r.e.); A & S Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Fischer, 622 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); Moya v.
O'Brien, 618 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
312. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e); see also Land Liquidators of Texas, Inc. v. Houston
Post Co., 630 S.W.2d 713, 714-15 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ); Barnham
v. Sugar Creek Nat'l Bank, 612 S.W.2d 78, 79-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981,
no writ); Tabor v. Medical Center Bank, 534 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th
Dist.] 1976, no writ) (if affiant's credibility is in issue summary judgment improper).
313. See Box v. Bates, 162 Tex. 184, 188, 346 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tex. 1961); Diggs v.
Enterprise Life Ins. Co., 646 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ refd
n.r.e.); West Coast Mining, Inc. v. National Bank of Lubbock, 442 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1969, writ refd n.r.e.).
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Likewise, the face of the affidavit should demonstrate that testimony
is given on personal knowledge."a 4 It is not enough to merely allege
that the affidavit is based on "personal knowledge.

3 15

Instead, the

affidavit must state how the affiant came to have personal knowledge
of the facts.31 6 For example, in a suit over a promissory note, it is
sufficient for the affidavit to reflect that the affiant is an officer of the
plaintiff company and as a result knew the facts
stated in the affidavit
31 7
company.
the
within
position
his
because of
Affidavits should also include specific identifiable facts.31 s The best
standard for the required specificity is whether the averments are direct and unequivocal and whether perjury could be assigned if the
facts prove to be incorrect. 3'9 Legal conclusions are not competent
evidence, and will not support a summary judgment even if no objection is raised. 20
The facts stated must be recited in a manner which would be admissible at the trial of the cause. 21 In fact, the best way to prepare
affidavits is in "substantially the same form as though the affiant were
314. See Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984). Those affidavits which
are based on other standards such as best knowledge and belief or upon information and belief
are insufficient. See Wells Fargo Constr. v. Bank of Woodlake, 645 S.W.2d 913, 914 (rex.
App.-Tyler 1983, no writ); Land Liquidators of Texas, Inc. v. Houston Post Co., 630 S.W.2d
713, 714-15 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ); Hagar v. Texas Distribs., Inc.,
560 S.W.2d 773, 775 (rex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Schultz v. City of
Houston, 551 S.W.2d 494, 496 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
315. See Sparks v. Cameron Employees Credit Union, 678 S.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); Jackson T. Fulgham Co. v. Stewart Title Co., 649
S.W.2d 128, 130 (rex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ); A & S Elec. Cont., Inc. v. Fisher, 622
S.W.2d 601, 603 (rex. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
316. See Jackson T. Fulgham Co. v. Stewart Title Co., 649 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
317. See id.at 130.
318. See Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984); see also TEX. R. Civ.
P. 166-A(e).
319. See Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984); Burke v. Satterfield,
525 S.W.2d 950, 954-55 (Tex. 1975); Dixon v. Mayfield Bldg. Supply Co., Inc., 543 S.W.2d 5,
7-8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(g).
320. See Mercer v. Daoron Corp., 676 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. 1984); Brownlee v.
Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984); Swiderski v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins.
Co., 672 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1984, no writ). In Mercer, the supreme
court emphatically stated the rule, "[a] legal conclusion in an affidavit is insufficient to raise an
issue of fact in response to a motion for summary judgment or to establish the existence of a
fact in support of a motion for summary judgment." Mercer v. Daoron Corp., 676 S.W.2d
580, 583 (Tex. 1984).
321. See Clark v. Dedina, 658 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983,
writ dism'd); see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
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'
giving testimony in court."322
As a result, evidence outside the affidavit must be introduced through the affidavit (generally by attachment
and acknowledgment) or by other summary judgment proof. Likewise, affidavits attached to the pleadings are not summary judgment
proof, and may not be considered by the court without other

predicate.323

In 1984 the supreme court expanded Rule 166-A to allow not only
the answers to discovery as summary judgment proof, but also to allow the consideration of stipulations of the parties and certified public
records.3 24 Therefore, it is increasingly important to remember that
all summary judgment proof must be filed with the court and made
part of the record so that it may be considered by both the trial court
and the reviewing appellate court.325 If the summary judgment proof
is not fied and included in the record, it may not be considered by a
court in either upholding or overruling the motion.
3. Response to Motion
In 1978, the supreme court radically changed Rule 166-A(c) and
added important language which states in part, "[i]ssues not expressly
presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other re3 26
sponse shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.
At the same time, the court amended section (e) of Rule 166-A to
provide, "[d]efects in the form of affidavits or attachments will not be
grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an
opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend. 3 27 A year
later in 1979, the supreme court in the case of City of Houston v. Clear
322. See 4 R. McDONALD, TExAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 17.26.5, at 173 (rev. ed. 1981).
323. See Hidalgo v. Surety Say. and Loan Ass'n, 462 S.W.2d 540, 545 (rex. 1971); Faour
v. Koenig, 662 S.W.2d 751, 751 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Sugarland Bus. Center, Ltd. v. Norman, 624 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, no writ). By the same token, the pleadings themselves are not summary judgment
proof even when sworn. See Hidalgo v. Surety Say. and Loan Ass'n, 462 S.W.2d 540, 545
(Tex. 1971); see also Menchaca v. Menchaca, 679 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1984,
no writ).
324. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c); see also id. comments.
325. See Clark v. Dedina, 658 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1983,
writ dism'd); Khalaf v. United Bus. Inv., Inc., 615 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Second Injury Fund, 584 S.W.2d
526, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
326. TEx. R. Clv. P. 166-A(c).
327. Id. 166-A(e).
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Creek Basin Authority328 was given an opportunity to explain the impact of these amendments on summary judgment practice and to emphasize the absolute necessity for a response to a motion for summary
judgment. In Clear Creek Basin, the court, reviewing its amendments
to Rule 166-A, held that if the respondent fails to make a written
response to the motion for summary judgment, any grounds that
3 29
could have been alleged by the respondent are waived on appeal.
As a result, if no response to the motion is filed, the only issue for
appeal is whether the movant's grounds and proof are sufficient as a
matter of law. 330 Any other grounds for avoidance of a summary
judgment are waived, even grounds that the statute supporting the
movant's claim is unconstitutional.331 However, some caution must
be used in interpreting Clear Creek Basin. It is still clear that the
movant must carry the burden of proof to demonstrate that no fact
issues exist.332 In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the
courts are still free to eliminate evidence that is incompetent and
which will not support a judgment. 33 For example, legal conclusions
will not support a judgment, and any summary judgments based
thereon are void. 3 4 Even so, the rules of evidence provide that hearsay, admitted without objection, will not be denied probative value. 335
As a result, hearsay admitted without objection will support a summary judgment.
The response must raise every reason the respondent wishes to set
forth for the denial of the summary judgment; otherwise, those rea328. 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979).
329. See id. at 676; see also Borown v. Owens, 674 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex. 1984).
330. See Nutchey v. Three R's Trucking Co., 674 S.W.2d 928, 929-30 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1984, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Burnett v. Houston Nat'l Gas Co., 617 S.W.2d 305,
306 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Hittner, Summary Judgments in Texas 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 207, 229-30 (1983).
331. See Barrera v. Farmer's Texas County Mut. Ins. Co., 643 S.W.2d 444, 446-47 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); accord City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589
S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).
332. See Cotton v. Ratholes, Inc., 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 15, 15 (Oct. 16, 1985); Fantastic
Homes v. Combs, 596 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex. 1979); Fisher v. Capp, 597 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
333. See Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984).
334. See Mercer v. Daoran, 676 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. 1984); Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665
S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984); Swiderski v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 672 S.W.2d
264, 268 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ dism'd).
335. See TEx. R. EvID. 802.
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sons may not be raised on appeal.3 36 While the rule does not state the
specificity required in the response, common sense would dictate that
the "fair notice" standard required in the motion for summary judgment itself would be appropriate. Furthermore, objections must be
made to any summary judgment proof which is not admissible and to
the form of the proof itself.337 It is clear that an amended answer,
although alleging new facts and causes of action, will not suffice as a
response to a motion for summary judgment.338
4. Time Periods
Rule 166-A includes its own time periods, the violation of which
can result in the waiver of valuable rights. For example, the motion
and affidavits of the movant must be filed and delivered at least
twenty-one (21) days before the hearing.3 39 This rule is absolute, and
unless leave of court is obtained with notice given to other parties, its
violation may void a motion for summary judgment. 340 However, if
the respondent appears at the hearing and does not file a response or a
Rule 166-A(f) affidavit, this complaint is waived on appeal. 341 The
respondent must file its affidavits and written response not later than
seven (7) days before the hearing. 342 The court, upon a proper motion, may, however, allow a late filing.3 43 This is a discretionary ruling, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an
abuse of discretion. 3 " Conversely, the trial court is not required to
consider an untimely filed response or affidavit, regardless of whether
336. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
337. See id. 166-A(e).
338. See Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Caldwell Banker Property Mgt. Co.,
635 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1982, no writ); see also City of Houston
v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 677-78 (Tex. 1979).
339. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
340. See Chandler v. Escobar, 604 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no
writ); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(O.
341. See Delta Petroleum & Energy Corp. v. Houston Fishing Tools Co., 670 S.W.2d
295, 296 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, no writ); Chandler v. Escobar, 604 S.W.2d
524, 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ); Lofthus v. State, 572 S.W.2d 799, 800 (rex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
342. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
343. See id. 166-A(c).
344. See Yates v. Equitable Gen. Ins. Co. of Texas, 672 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tex. App.-

Houston [1st Dist.] 1984), aff'd, 684 S.W.2d 669 (rex. 1985); Rhodes v. City of Austin, 584
S.W.2d 917, 921-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ret'd n.r.e.); Ervin v. Gerber Life Ins.
Co., 566 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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a motion to strike is made.345
5. Appeal and Standard of Review
An order granting a motion for summary judgment results in a final
appealable judgment unless the judgment is a partial summary judgment.3 46 Conversely, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable.34 7 The only exception to this rule is when
both parties have filed motions for summary judgment, and one is
granted.348 If this occurs, the losing party may appeal the denial of its
motion as well as contesting the granting of the opponent's motion.34 9
In seeking the reversal of a summary judgment, the proper point of
error is, "[t]he trial court erred in granting the motion for summary
judgment. 35 0 Naturally, there may be several subparts to the point
of error directing the court's attention to certain specific errors of concern. The classic questions on appeal are the same questions raised in
the trial court - whether there is a disputed issue of material fact,
and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.35 1
In deciding these questions, the evidence and all inferences therefrom
are viewed in a light favorable to the non-movant. 352 Additionally,
any attempt of the trial court to file findings of fact to bolster the

345. See Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ
refd n.r.e.); see also Metze v. Eatman, 584 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, no writ).
346. See Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex. 1984); Schlipf v. Exxon
Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. 1982); Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Tex.
1980).
347. See Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex. 1984); Schlipf v. Exxon
Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. 1982); Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Tex.

1980).
348. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A.
349. See Teledyne Isotopes, Inc. v. Bravenec, 640 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.); Crystal City Indep. School Dist. v. Crawford, 612 S.W.2d
73, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Texaco Inc. v. Great S. Life Ins.
Co., 590 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
350. See Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970); see also Jackson
T. Fulgham Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 649 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no
writ).
351. See Gibbs v. Gen. Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970); Prestegord v.
Glenn, 441 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. 1969); General Specialties, Inc. v. Charter Nat'l BankHouston, 687 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
352. See Wilcox v. St. Mary's Univ. of San Antonio, 531 S.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Tex. 1975);
see also General Specialties, Inc. v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Houston, 687 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol17/iss2/2

54

Keltner and Burke: Protecting the Record for Appeal: A Reference Guide in Texas Civi

1986]

PROTECTING THE RECORD FOR APPEAL

judgment is improper and should be ignored by the appellate court.3 53
The practitioner should keep in mind that the courts of Texas continue to look upon summary judgments as a harsh remedy, and are
reluctant to deny a party its day in court.35 4' As a result, summary
judgments are upheld only when the movant clearly establishes a
right thereto as a matter of law.3 5
K.

Right to Trial by Jury
The right to trial by jury is almost absolute in civil cases.35 6 Even

so, the right can be waived if the provisions of Rule 216 are not
strictly followed. 357 Rule 216 provides that there shall be no trial by
jury unless a jury is timely requested and a jury fee paid in advance of
the trial date.358

353. See Cotton v. Ratholes, Inc., 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 15, 15 (Oct. 16, 1985).
354. See, e.g., Wilcox v. St. Mary's Univ. of San Antonio, 531 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tex.
1975); Gulbendien v. Penn, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1952); General Specialties, Inc. v.
Charter Nat'l Bank-Houston, 687 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
writ).
355. See Wilcox v. St. Mary's Univ. of San Antonio, 531 S.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Tex. 1975);
see also Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970); TEx. R. Civ. P.
166-A(c).
356. See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 278 F. Supp. 632, 635 (S.D. Tex.
1968) (should only deny trial before jury with great caution), rev'd on other grounds, 427 F.2d
319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Jones v. Jones, 592 S.W.2d 19, 19 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ) (right of trial by jury is valuable right to be guarded
jealously by state courts); Rayson v. Johns, 524 S.W.2d 380, 382 (rex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (right to jury trial is valuable and should be jealously guarded); see also
TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 15; Silver v. Shefman, 287 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (right to trial before jury is sacred right).
357. See, e.g., Huddle v. Huddle, 696 S.W.2d 895, 895 (rex. 1985) (request which is not
timely can waive right to jury); Gaines v. Gaines, 677 S.W.2d 727, 729 (rex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, no writ) (although Texas Constitution states right to trial by jury to be inviolate,
this right is not absolute in civil cases); Coleman v. Sadler, 608 S.W.2d 344, 346 (rex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ) (even though state constitution maintains that right to trial by
jury remains inviolate, in civil cases this right is not absolute); see also Henderson v. Youngblood, 512 S.W.2d 35, 36-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ) (right to trial by jury
depends on procedural requisites and is not absolute in civil cases); Mackay v. Charles W.
Sexton Co., 469 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, no writ) (right to trial before
jury is subject to procedural requirements and, thus, is not absolute in civil cases); TEx. R.
Civ. P. 216.
358. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 216; see also Huddle v. Huddle, 696 S.W.2d 895, 895 (Tex.
1985) (time limitations of Rule 216 apply with equal force to application for jury trial and
payment of jury fee); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 876-77 (rex. 1968)
(demand for jury trial made ten days in advance of date set for trial of cause on non-jury
docket is not necessarily timely as a matter of law); Young v. Young, 589 S.W.2d 520, 521
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Rule 216 provides that the request for a jury shall be made on or
before appearance day or a reasonable time before the date set for trial
of the cause, but not less than ten (10) days in advance of the trial
setting. 3 9 As a result, the cases interpreting Rule 216 have held that
the court has no discretion to refuse a jury trial if the fee is paid and a
request is made on or before the appearance or answer date. 36 Furthermore, a demand made more than ten (10) days in advance of a
trial setting is presumed reasonable. 361 However, a demand for a jury
trial made ten (10) days in advance of trial is not necessarily timely as
a matter of law if the fee is not paid as well.362 The recent supreme
court case of Huddle v. Huddle3 63 demonstrates the problem. The
case was set for trial on the merits for the week of July 13, 1983. A
jury fee had been paid on June 30, 1983, but a jury request was not
made until July 12, 1983, the day before trial.36 In interpreting Rule
216, the supreme court held that the ten (10) day time period applies
with equal force to both the payment of the jury fee and the actual
request for a jury trial. 365 As a result, the court held that the respondent's right to trial by jury was waived and the refusal of a jury trial
could not be complained of on appeal.366 Likewise, failure to appear
at a scheduled trial date constitutes a waiver of the right to a jury
trial, even though a fee was paid and a proper jury demand had previously been made.367
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ dism'd) (jury demand made ten days before trial is not, as
matter of law, timely).
359. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 216; see also Huddle v. Huddle, 696 S.W.2d 895, 895 (Tex.
1985); Walker v. Walker, 619 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
360. See Squires v. Squires, 673 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ); First Bankers Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 417 S.W.2d 738, 739-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1967, no writ); Union Producing Co. v. Allen, 297 S.W.2d 867, 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, no writ).
361. See M-M-M v. Central St. Depository of Crim. Records, 681 S.W.2d 908, 908-09
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ); Coleman v. Sadler, 608 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ); W. C. Moody & Co., Bankers v. Yarbrough, 510 S.W.2d 396,
399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
362. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Bela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 876-77 (Tex. 1968); Gaines v.
Gaines, 677 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); Walker v. Walker,
619 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
363. 696 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1985).
364. See id. at 895.
365. See id. at 895.
366. See id. at 895.
367. See Lopez v. Soliz, 619 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no
writ); Chandler v. Chandler, 536 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1976, error
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L. Motion in Limine
The purpose of a motion in limine is to obtain a prior ruling on
evidentiary matters and to prevent the injection of irrelevant, inadmissible, and prejudicial matters into the trial.368 The court's ruling,
either granting or denying the motion, is not a final ruling, and does
not constitute an appealable order, cause reversible error, or form the
basis for an appeal. 369 The admission or suppression of evidence during the trial can, however, result in reversible error, and the practitioner must take care to preserve the error at that stage. In order to
preserve error on appeal for the wrongful suppression of evidence, the
record must reflect that the party opposing the motion in limine offered the suppressed evidence during the trial and obtained an adverse
ruling from the court.370 If error is claimed for the wrongful admission of evidence, the record must reflect that the party seeking to suppress the evidence made a proper objection when the evidence
actually was offered during the trial on the merits.37 1

III. TRIAL RULINGS
A.

Voir Dire

The voir dire procedure is a traditional part of jury trials in
Texas. 7 2 However, there are no rules governing the latitude allowed
in the examination of jurors, and only three rules of civil procedure
refer directly to the voir dire examination.37 3 While the right to condism'd); see also Crabbe v. Hord, 536 S.W.2d 409, 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
368. See Ford v. Carpenter, 147 Tex. 447, 450, 216 S.W.2d 558, 560 (1949); see also
Bifano v. Young, 665 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
369. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex.
1963); Bifano v. Young, 665 S.W.2d 536, 541 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1983, writ refd
n.r.e.); Union Carbide Corp. v. Burton, 618 S.W.2d 410, 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
370. See National Living Centers, Inc. v. Cities Realty Corp., 619 S.W.2d 422, 425 (rex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ refd n.r.e.); Roberts v. Tatum, 575 S.W.2d 138, 144 (rex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Corpus Christi v. Nemec, 404
S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ).
371. See Wilkins v. Royal Indem. Co., 592 S.W.2d 64, 66-67 (rex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, no writ); Biard Dil Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 522 S.W.2d 588, 590 (rex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ); K-Mart No. 4195 v. Judge, 515 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1974, writ dism'd).
372. See Hazel, Jury Voir Dire in Texas Civil Cases, 1 REv. Lrr. 147 (1981).
373. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 327, 372(1), 376(b). Several other rules do deal with the chal-
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duct voir dire examination is firmly implanted in Texas practice, it
has no constitutional or statutory support.37 4 In conducting the voir
dire examination, the trial court exercises broad discretion, with less
scrutiny from an appellate court than in any other matter.3 75 As a
result of this broad discretion, there is wide variation among trial
courts in the method of conducting voir dire examination. Many
courts conduct the majority of the voir dire by questions from the
bench.376 In other cases, the voir dire examination is left solely to the
lawyers.3 77 In recent years legal authors, recognizing this variation in
methods, have proposed uniform voir dire practices. 378 However, no
uniform procedure has been adopted. Increasingly, trial courts have
attempted to shorten the voir dire examination and to limit its scope.
These efforts by the trial courts are generally upheld on appeal by
opinions which indicate that the conduct of voir dire is within the
exclusive control of trial courts.37 9

To adequately protect the record, the lawyer should direct specific
questions to individual jury panel members. 380 General questions of
the entire panel are generally not considered as an adequate basis for
jury misconduct in a subsequent motion for new trial. 3a8 Additionally, all voir dire examination should be recorded, as courts are almost unanimous in the proposition that to properly preserve error
lenging of jurors for cause and for peremptory challenges. See id. 227-223. Other rules deal
with instructions and oaths to the jury panel. See id. 223-226a.
374. See Bush, Limitation on Voir Dire in Civil Cases, 45 TEX. B.J. 1043, 1043 (Oct.
1982).
375. See Gulf States Util. Co. v. Reed, 659 S.W.2d 849, 855 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Flores v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 515 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, writ dism'd); see also Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Loesch, 538
S.W.2d 435, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
376. E.g., Leverman v. Cartall, 393 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
377. See Bush, Limitation on Voir Dire in Civil Cases, 45 TEx. B.J. 1043, 1044 (1982).
378. See Burleson, Voir Dire, Trial Tactics, and Jury Arguments - Putting Flesh on the
Bones of a Lawsuit, 17 TRIAL LAW. F. 2, 15 (1983); Hunt, Shortening the Voir Dire, 25 TEX.
B.J. 863, 864 (1962).
379. See Fenton v. Wade, 303 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); New Orleans Ry. Co. v. Broadway, 345 S.W.2d 814, 820-21 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1961, no writ).
380. See Coulson v. Clark, 319 S.W.2d 183, 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1958, writ refd
n.r.e.).
381. See Thompson v. Quarles, 297 S.W.2d 321, 325-26 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Roy L. Truck Line v. Johnson, 225 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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from the voir dire examination, it is necessary to have the voir dire
questions and answers in the statement of facts.38 2 In this regard, the
court reporter has the duty to record voir dire examination if it is
requested by the lawyers. 3 Likewise, any complaints about the conduct of the voir dire examination must be made by prompt objection
or the error is waived. 84
1. Peremptory Challenge
Peremptory challenges are made as a matter of right by a party
who is not required to assign any reason for the challenge to jurors.3 85
Generally, each party in district court is allowed six (6) challenges,
38 6
and each party in county court is allowed three (3) challenges.
While Rule 233 is generally applied without difficulty, appellate
problems do arise when there are multiple parties and peremptory
challenges are equalized.38 7 Under amended Rule 233, the court is
required to decide whether any of the parties aligned on the same side
of the docket are antagonistic with respect to any issues that are likely
to be submitted to the jury.388 This inquiry must be made before the
exercise of peremptory challenges, and the answer is determined in
large amount from the pleadings, pre-trial discovery, and other information disclosed to the court. 389 The existence of antagonism is not a
matter within the trial court's discretion. Instead, it is a question of
law, "whether any of the litigants aligned on the same side of the
docket are antagonistic with respect to any issue to be submitted to
382. See Lauderdale v. Insurance Co. of North America, 527 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ refd n.r.e.); Fenton v. Wade, 303 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1957, writ refd n.r.e.).
383. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 376b(a)(2).
384. See Gulf States Util. Co. v. Reed, 659 S.W.2d 849, 855 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1983, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Loesch, 538 S.W.2d 435, 441 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
385. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 232, 233; see also Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d
914, 919 (Tex. 1979). See generally Jones, Peremptory Challenges--Should Rule 233 Be
Changed?, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 80 (1966).
386. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 233; see also 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE
§ 11.12.1, at 130 (1984).
387. See Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. 1979); Malone &
Hyde, Inc. v. Hobrecht, 685 S.W.2d 739, 751-52 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
withdrawn).
388. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 233; see also City of Amarillo v. Reid, 510 S.W.2d 624, 626
(Tex.Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
389. Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 919 (rex. 1979); Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532, 534 (rex. 1974).
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Once the court has decided the issue of antagonism, the

court is to dispense peremptory challenges to achieve the "ends of
justice" so that no side will have an "unequal advantage."' 39' Exact
numerical equality between the sides is not necessary.39 2 Instead, the
court is free to proportionalize the strikes fairly.39 3 In this regard,
only vague guidelines have been given by the courts. In the landmark
decision of Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn,394 the supreme court held
that a disparity in peremptory challenges between sides of as much as
four to one results in a materially unfair trial as a matter of law, and
will not be condoned. 395 Another decision has upheld the allocation
of nine strikes to the plaintiff and eleven to a group of four defendants.396 The Houston Court of Appeals has ruled that a two to one
ratio reaches the maximum disparity allowable.3 97 Any objections to
the allocation of strikes must be tendered before the actual strikes are
made, and the record must reflect the ruling of the court.398 Otherwise, any error will be waived.39 9 One of the best practical steps to
preserve error is to submit proposed issues to the court prior to trial,
to demonstrate any antagonism between co-parties.
2. Challengefor Cause
A challenge for cause is, "an objection made to a juror, alleging
some fact which by law disqualifies him to serve as a juror in the case
390. Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. 1979). For a discussion of
the court's determination of these types of issues, see Sheehan & Hollingsworth, Allocation of
Peremptory Challenges Among Multiple Parties, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 511, 512-23 (1979).
391. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 233.
392. See Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 920 (Tex. 1979); Malone &
Hyde, Inc. v. Hobrecht, 685 S.W.2d 739, 751 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
withdrawn).
393. See Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 920 (Tex. 1979); see also
Sheehan & Hollingsworth, Allocation of Peremptory ChallengesAmong Multiple Parties,10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 511, 514-18 (1979).
394. 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1979).
395. See id. at 921.
396. See Brown v. Tucker, 652 S.W.2d 492, 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983,
no writ).
397. See Williams v. Texas City Ref., Inc., 617 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
398. See Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. 1979); Longoria v.
Atlantic Gulf Enter., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
399. See H. P. Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Shiflett, 593 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1979, writ refd fi.r.e.).
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or in any case, or which in the opinion of the court renders him an

unfit person to sit on the jury."' Actually, there are two categories
of challenges for cause. First are the minimum requirements for jurors listed in article 2133.141 In most counties, the judge or other

court officers will briefly interrogate the jury for these qualifications
before voir dire examination. However, challenges based on these

minimum qualifications may be waived if objections are not made at
the time of trial.' 2 As a result, it is incumbent on the lawyer to determine that the jury panel has been purged of illegal jurors. 4°3
The second category is statutory disqualifications that deal with
bias and prejudice.'
The bias and prejudice standards codified in
article 2134 include not only bias or prejudice against a person or
party, but also against the subject matter of the lawsuit as well.' 5
The question of whether bias or prejudice exists is a fact question

which will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion." 6 On the other hand, once the bias or prejudice is established, it is a legal disqualification, and reversible error results if the
court overrules a motion to strike.4 0 7 As a result, if bias or prejudice
of a juror is established, the juror should be struck, and any attempt
on behalf of the court or opposing counsel to rehabilitate the juror
should not be allowed."° Occasionally, the court will be confronted
with challenges which do not fall within articles 2133 or 2134. Chal-

lenges for cause based on those types of complaints are addressed to
400. TEX. R. CIv. P. 228.
401. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2133 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
402. See Jenkins v. Chapman, 636 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Bailey v. Tuck, 591 S.W.2d 605, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
403. See Jenkins v. Chapman, 636 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ
retd n.r.e.); Mitchell v. Burleson, 466 S.W.2d 646, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). The minimum qualifications of jurors, however, are generally checked by court
personnel outside the presence of attorney.
404. See Tnx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2134 (Vernon 1964); see also Bettis v. Bettis,
518 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
405. See TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2134, § 4 (Vernon 1964); see also Ramirez v.
Wood, 577 S.W.2d 278, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
406. See Swap Shop v. Fortune, 365 S.W.2d 151, 154 (rex. 1963); Ramirez v. Wood, 577
S.W.2d 278, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
407. See Comptron v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 181-82 (Tex. 1963); State v. Burke, 434
S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, no writ).
408. See Erwin v. Consolvo, 521 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no
writ); Carpenter v. White Constr. Co., 501 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
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the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court's ruling will not
be disturbed unless it appears that a fair and impartial trial was
thereby denied.'
A recent supreme court case explains the method to preserve error
when a court overrules a challenge of a prospective juror for cause. In
Hallett v. Houston Northwest Medical Center,41 ° the supreme court
was confronted with a medical malpractice case in which the court
overruled a challenge for cause to a juror made by the plaintiff.41
After the trial, the plaintiff moved for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the basis that the objectionable juror was permitted to serve
and participated in the return of an unfavorable verdict.41 2 The affidavit accompanying the motion stated that the plaintiff had exhausted
her peremptory challenges, and that three of those challenges were
41 3
used to strike three persons unsuccessfully challenged for cause.
The supreme court analyzed the issue presented as, "the proper
method for preserving error when a litigant is compelled to accept an
objectionable juror who has been challenged for cause. 414
The supreme court rejected the plaintiff's argument that once a juror has been challenged for cause, the trial court is aware that the
juror is objectionable, and it is unnecessary to require a party to advise the court a second time of the objection.415 Instead, the supreme
court noted that the real question is whether the harm complained of
resulted in reversible error rather than harmless error.41 6 The court
ruled that a party who is forced to accept an objectionable juror challenged for cause must take the following steps to preserve the error
for appeal: (1) make a challenge for cause, (2) exhaust all peremptory
challenges, and (3) after exercising all peremptory challenges, make a
specific objection to the jurors who remain on the jury list, and state
why those individual jurors remain objectionable and would other409. See Speer v. Continental Oil Co., 586 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State v. Bryan, 518 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1975, no writ); City of Hawkins v. E. B. Germany & Sons, 425 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
410. 689 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. 1985).
411. See id. at 889.
412. See id. at 889.
413. See id. at 889.
414. Id. at 889.
415. See id. at 889.
416. See id at 889.
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wise be struck by that party.41 7 The court further held, "absent such
notice to the trial court [a party] waives any error committed by the
court in its refusal to discharge those jurors who were challenged for
cause."4 18 Although the opinion does not specifically classify it as an
additional requirement, it is obvious that those objections must be
made before the jurors are struck, and not after the peremptory
strikes are turned over to the judge.4 19

B. Opening Statement
Each party may make an opening statement to the jury; however,
the statement must be limited in scope to what the party will prove
during the course of the trial and the relief that is sought.420 The trial
court has broad discretion to limit the opening statements, subject to
review on appeal for abuse of discretion.4 21 The general rule is that all
statements made in the opening statement must be admissible into
evidence as if they were uttered from the witness stand.422 Additionally, it is error to discuss evidence that is not eventually offered during
the trial.4 23 Not all error in the opening statement, however, results in
reversible error. To cause the reversal of the judgment, the error must
be such that it was calculated to cause, and probably did cause, rendition of an improper judgment.424 Objections to opening statements
must be made in a timely and specific manner for the error to be
4 25

preserved.

417. See id. at 890. The court cited Hamman v. Texas New Orleans Ry. Co., 382 S.W.2d
155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ refd n.r.e.), cerL denied, 382 U.S. 832 (1965); Yecker v.
San Antonio Traction Co., 76 S.W. 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1903, writ refd); and
Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Moreno, 638 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982,
no writ), as support for its preservation of error rule.
418. Hallett v. Houston Northwest Medical Center, 689 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. 1985).
419. Cf id. at 890.
420. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 265.
421. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975,
writ refd n.r.e.).
422. See Sisk v. Glens Fall Ind. Co., 310 S.W.2d 118, 122 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston
1958, writ refd n.r.e.).
423. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975,
writ refd n.r.e.); Vincent v. M K & T RR. Co., 200 S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1946, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 830 (1947).
424. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Garza, 675 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.); Rangers Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 170 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
425. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Exclusion and Admission of Evidence
1. Objections
a.

Specific Objections

The general rule is that an erroneous admission of evidence requires
a timely and specific objection to preserve error for appeal. 26 As a
result, an objection to evidence cannot be heard for the first time on
appeal.427
The objection must clearly state the grounds upon which it is made
and the evidence it seeks to exclude.42 The test of whether an objection contains the required specificity is whether the objection can be
clearly understood by the court and the opposing party. 429 A general
objection, such as the famous Perry Mason objection of, "immaterial,
incompetent, and irrelevant," generally preserves no error for appeal. 43 0 Trial practitioners must be careful in framing their objections
as objections not made at the trial level cannot be argued on appeal as
grounds for reversal.4 3 1 For example, in Douglas v. Winkle4 32 an ob426. See generally Perry, PracticalEffects of Texas Rules of Evidence, 18 TRIAL LAW. F.
12 (1983); Pope and Hampton, Presentingand Excluding Evidence, 9 TEX. TECH L. REv. 403
(1978).
427. See Wilfin, Inc. v. Williams, 615 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Davis, 582 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1979, no writ); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(l).
428. See Hill v. Baylor, 23 Tex. 261, 263 (1859); Cobb v. Thomas, 565 S.W.2d 281, 289
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Prior to 1984, there were some extremely
limited exceptions to the necessity for an objection. Some evidence was considered to be so
incompetent so as to not support a judgment, and as a result, no objection was necessary. See
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Klein, 160 Tex. 61, 63, 325 S.W.2d 376, 379 (1959); International Ins. Co. v.
Deatherage, 628 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. App.-Austin, no writ). But see TEX. R. EVID. 802
(unobjected hearsay has probative value).
429. See In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420, 432 (Tex. 1977); Texas Mun. Power Agency v.
Burger, 600 S.w.2d 850, 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); see also
Harry Brown, Inc. v. McBryde, 622 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); University of Texas Sys. v. Haywood, 546 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ). See generally Black, Hearsay Evidence Admitted Without Objection-A Defense of Its
Probative Value, 17 S. TEX. L.J. 69 (1975).
430. See Brown & Root v. Haddad, 142 Tex. 624, 626, 180 S.W.2d 339, 341 (1941);
Republic Ins. Co. v. Hope, 557 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ); Easley
v. Brookline Trust Co., 256 S.W.2d 983, 986 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, no writ). Some
objections, however, by their very nature must be general. Objections to the relevancy of testimony are general in nature and seek to exclude evidence because it has no connection with the
trial issues. See TEX. R. EvID. 401-03; see also Bridges v. City of Richardson, 354 S.W.2d 366,
370 (Tex. 1962).
431. See Del Monte Corp. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
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jection was made at trial on the basis of hearsay.43 3 On appeal, other
grounds were urged, and the appellate court held that they were not
properly preserved and could not be argued as grounds for reversal.434
b. Partly Admissible Evidence
In recent years, courts have wrestled with the interesting problem
of evidence which contains both admissible and inadmissible parts.
The general rule of evidence is that the burden is on the offering party
to remove inadmissible portions of evidence before the offer can be
allowed.4 35 The landmark case of Hurtadov. Texas Employers'Insurance Ass'n 436 demonstrates the problems when exhibits with numerous pages are introduced into evidence. In Hurtado, the insurance
company offered into evidence in the form of four exhibits the complete medical records of the plaintiff which reflected a long history of
previous health problems and prior injuries numbering over 280 pages
of clinical reports, hospital records, nurses' notes, physicial examination reports, as well as other medical documents.4 37 The plaintiff objected that the offer included matters of hearsay, inadmissible opinion
evidence, and suggested that it was incumbent on the offeror to eliminate those items.438 Counsel for the defendant stated that if the plaintiff thought anything was objectionable, he should point out the
document and make a specific objection.4 39 The trial court allowed
the introduction of the evidence for all purposes."' The supreme
court, in reviewing the evidence, found many of the entries in the
medical records to be inadmissible, but also found a substantial
amount of the information to be admissible. The court stated that the
Antonio 1978, no writ); Eubanks v. Winn, 469 S.W.2d 191, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
432. 623 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
433. See id. at 768. The trial objection was that the testimony in a will contest was "hearsay... and unresponsive." Id. at 768.
434. See id. at 768. The additional grounds for objection which were not preserved were
bolstering, irrelevancy, and prejudice. See id. at 768.
435. See Spier v. Webster College, 616 S.W.2d 612, 619 (Tex. 1981); Lister v. Employers
Reins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Fex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Zamora v. Romero, 581 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
436. 574 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1978).
437. See id. at 537.
438. See id. at 537-38.
439. See id. at 537.
440. See id. at 538.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

65

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 2, Art. 2

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:273

records as a whole were inadmissible."' The opinion, however, without specifically stating, indicates that it is incumbent on the offeror to
weed 2 out inadmissible evidence. Otherwise, the entire offer may
4
fail. "
c. Limited Purpose Doctrine
Generally, evidence which is admitted without objection or limitation is an offer for all purposes." 3 On the other hand, if evidence is
admissible for one purpose and not for another, the evidence cannot
be admitted without a limiting instruction.'
If the offeror fails to
limit the offer, no error is preserved for appeal. 445
d. Timeliness
The general rule is that objections must be made at the earliest opportunity. 44 6 However, in vigorously contested trials, some complications can result. For example, when prior similar testimony is
admitted without objection, a later objection to similar testimony will
be unsuccessful." 7 By the same token, objections to testimony must
441. See id. at 538-39.
442. See id. at 538. The court stated that once the inadmissible portions of the evidence
had been brought to the trial judge's attention it was error to admit the entire mass of material
without removing the objectionable parts. See id. at 538. The Hurtado opinion also ignores
the most practical solution, which often occurs at trial. When an objection occurs, the objectionable parts of the exhibit are often removed and the remainder admitted into evidence. In
Hurtado, however, this practical adaption might have undercut the purpose of the defendant's
original offer-to show the worker's overall health condition.
443. See Ryan Mortg. Investors v. Fleming-Wood, 650 S.W.2d 928, 935 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1983, writ rerd n.r.e.); Douglas v. Winkle, 623 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1981, no writ); Scotchcraft Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Parker, 618 S.W.2d 835, 837
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ret'd n.r.e.). See generally 1 R. RAY, TEXAS
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 774 (3rd ed. 1980).
444. See In re TLH, 630 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ);
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 430-31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
445. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 154 Tex. 511, 514, 180 S.W.2d 588, 591 (1955); In re
TLH, 630 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi, 1982, no writ); Miller v. Hardy, 564
S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
446. See Wolfe v. East Texas Seed Co., 583 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd); Zamora v. Romero, 581 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
447. See Winkel v. Hankins, 585 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ
dism'd); Hundere v. Tracy & Cook, 494 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Plainsman Elevators, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 68,
72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
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be made each time an attempt to introduce the evidence is made, and
a prior objection will not preserve error of subsequently admitted evidence." 8 However, one exception is the well known "running objection." When a party has previously made a proper objection to
immediately preceding testimony and the objection is overruled, a
subsequent objection to the same testimony is not necessarily a predicate to complain on appeal if a running objection is made.' 9 Running
objections can present a very dangerous situation. While running objections do save time and obviate the necessity for counsel to repeat
objections in front of a jury, the reason for the rule is based on the
similarity of the objection to the continued line of questioning. As a
result, all counsel and the court should be aware of the exact questions to which the running objections apply. Unfortunately, no appellate court in Texas has directly addressed the issue of running
objections, and there can always be a question as to whether the evidence subsequently introduced is similar enough to preserve error by
way of a running objection. As a result, the best practice is to have an
agreement with the court that a running objection to a line of questions is acceptable. This small bit of precaution may preserve error.
e. Necessity of a Ruling
It is axiomatic that there must be a ruling expressly overruling the
objection in order to preserve the point for appellate review."1° However, some difficulty arises with this rule when judges are slow to rule
on objections or ignore the problem in the hope that the witness will
answer and the reason for the objection will disappear. It is the duty
of each court to promptly rule on objections. Stated another way,
"one making an objection is entitled to an immediate ruling omitting
or excluding the evidence either absolutely or conditionally so that he
448. See In re Dahl, 590 S.W.2d 191, 199 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Poole v. State Highway Dept., 256 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1953, writ dism'd).
449. See Welch v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 636 S.W.2d 450, 453 (rex. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ); City of Baytown v. Bayshore Constructors, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 792, 794
(Tex.Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); DLN v. State, 590 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
450. See Winkel v. Hankins, 585 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ
dism'd); Citizens of Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lewis, 483 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Roberts v. Tatum, 575 S.W.2d 138, 144 (rex. Civ.
App.--Corpus Christi 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (before party can claim error on suppression of
evidence by motion in limine, party must offer evidence and secure adverse ruling from court).
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may know what evidence on his part will be needed in explanation or
'
rebuttal."451
Counsel should therefore always tactfully press the
court for a ruling so that the error will be properly preserved.
f. Offers of Proof
In instances where evidence is suppressed by the trial court, an offer
of proof is necessary to preserve error in the exclusion of evidence.4 2
The obvious purpose of the offer of proof is to demonstrate to the
appellate court the substance of the excluded testimony. 53 The only
exception to this rule is when the excluded testimony is a properly
marked and identified exhibit which requires no predicate for its admission. 54 However, almost every exhibit offered at trial does require
some explanatory testimony as a predicate for its admission. As a
result, every exhibit must be accompanied by an offer of proof.
Recent rules of evidence provide several methods for the offer of
proof that differ from previous practice.4 5 For example, it is appropriate to have an offer of proof that is not in the standard question
and answer form. 56 Instead, a summary of evidence can be read into
the record rather than lengthy question and answer testimony.457
However, the court may request the making of an offer of proof in
question and answer form, and the nonmovant can require that the
offer of proof be made in question and answer form.458 In some instances where a court reporter is unavailable, formal bills of exception
may be used.45 9 These bills of exception are cumbersome and have
451. Citizens of Texas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lewis, 483 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1972, writ refd n.r.e.).
452. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex.
1963); Roberts v. Tatum, 575 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Garza, 557 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
453. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Garza, 557 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.). The task of the appellate court is to review the excluded
evidence with all other evidence in the record in order to apply the harmless error rule. As a
result, it is important to have the precise testimony preserved in the record in order to urge

error on appeal.
454. See Guynn v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 589 S.W.2d 764, 772 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1979, writ dism'd).
455. See TEx. R. EVID. 103(a)(2), 103(b).
456. See TEX. R. EVID. 103(b) (court may or at counsel's request shall direct making of
an offer in question and answer form).
457. See id. 103(b).
458. See id. 103(b).
459. See TEx. R. CIv. P. 372.
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fallen into disuse. Likewise, the bystanders bill is available if no
agreement can be made on a formal bill of exception.4 6° The bystanders bill may be made on the affidavit of three respected bystanders
who are citizens of the state, and who can attest to the correctness of
the actual averments. Lawyers who represent parties to the lawsuit
cannot be witnesses for a bystander bill affidavits. The truth of the
averments are determined by the court of appeals during the appellate
process.461
D. Directed (Instructed) Verdict
The trial court may remove the case from the jury and direct or
instruct a verdict for either party when reasonable minds cannot differ
on the conclusions drawn from the evidence. 462 The motion for instructed verdict is mentioned directly only two times in the rules of
civil procedure, with little direction on the required contents of the
motion.463 For example, Rule 268 merely provides, "a motion for directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. ' '41, Even so, a
large body of case law has developed around directed verdict practice.
As with other motions, the appellate record must reflect that the
motion was made and a ruling of the court obtained as a prerequisite
for appeal. 6 5 Additionally, the motion for directed verdict may be
made two times during the trial. First, the motion may be made after
460. See id 3720).
461. See Griffith v. Casteel, 313 S.W.2d 149, 153-54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Griffith, the Houston Court of Appeals interestingly found that the eventual Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of the Houston Court of
Appeals were not eligible to make a controverting affidavit pursuant to a bystanders bill. See
i at 153-54.
462. See Jones v. Tarrant Util. Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982); Collora v. Navarro,
574 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. 1978); Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649, 650 (rex.
1976); see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 268.
463. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 268, 301.
464. Id. 268.
465. See Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. West, 677 S.W.2d 669, 673 (rex. App.Amarillo 1984, no writ); Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Allen, 664 S.W.2d 136, 145 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Allen, the court of appeals stated, "[t]he overruling of a motion for instructed verdict will be reviewed on appeal only if it was recited in a
formal order or in the judgment." See id at 145 (emphasis in original). The appellant inAllen
sought review of the trial court's action in overruling the motion for instructed verdict. See id.
at 145. The appellate record did not reflect an order entered by the court, and the judgment
did not contain any recitation of the overruling of the motion for instructed verdict. As a
result, the court refused to consider any error in that regard. See id. at 145.
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the conclusion of the nonmovant's case.466 If the motion is overruled,
any complaint on appeal for the denial of the first motion is waived if
the movant proceeds with its own evidence.467 Second, the motion
can be reurged after the close of all the evidence.4 68 Finally, if the
defendant has made a motion for instructed verdict after the close of
the plaintiff's evidence, the motion must be reurged after both sides
have rested to properly preserve error for appeal.469 It is important to
note that a motion for instructed verdict after the evidence is closed
must be made before the charge is read to the jury.470 Appellate
courts have ruled that a motion for instructed or directed verdict need
not be in writing if the grounds for the motion are specifically
stated.471
If a motion for instructed or directed verdict is granted, several
appellate rules apply. First, the review of the directed verdict is limited to consideration of the evidence that had been presented when the
motion was granted, and does not involve review of all the evidence in
the case.472 When an instructed or directed verdict is granted because
466. See Meyers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 619 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Rhinetubes, Inc. v. Norddeutscher Lloyd, 335 S.W.2d 269, 274
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally 4 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS
CIVIL PRACTICE § 16.04, at 5 (1984).
467. See Hydro-Line Mfg. Co. v. Pulido, 674 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.); Wenk v. City Nat'l Bank, 613 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
468. See Mitchell Resort Enter., Inc. v. C & F Builders, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Conrey v. McGehee, 473 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
469. See Hydro-Line Mfg. Co. v. Pulido, 674 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.); Wenk v. City Nat'l Bank, 613 S.W.2d 345, 348 (rex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
470. See Mitchell Resort Enters., Inc. v. C & F Builders, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). But see Chasco v. Providence Memorial Hosp.,
476 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, no writ) (after jury discharged, motion
for instructed verdict may be tendered because of jury's inability to agree upon verdict).
471. See Dillard v. Broyles, 633 S.W.2d 636, 645 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983); Castillo v. Euresti, 579 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 268 (Rule 268 does not require formal
written motion to secure instructed verdict).
472. See Safeway Scaffold Co. v. Safeway Steel Prods., Inc., 570 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Holloway v. Har-Con Eng'g Co., 563
S.W.2d 695, 696-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this
regard, it is interesting to note that subsequent jury findings cannot be used to attack an instructed verdict granted in another part of the case. See Pope v. Clary, 161 S.W.2d 828, 832
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942, writ refd w.o.m.).
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there is lack of proof of damages, the appellate court must make a
thorough examination of the statement of facts to determine if there is
73
any evidence of probative value that might support a jury issue.
The standard of review for the granting of a motion for instructed or
directed verdict on appeal is strict.474 The court must consider all of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
verdict was instructed, discarding all contrary evidence and inferences.475 However, the burden is upon the appellant to establish that
evidence was presented on each and every
element of the various
4 76
pleadings.
the
in
alleged
causes of action
E. Special Issues, Instructions,and Requests (Findingsof Fact and
Conclusions of Law)
One of the most difficult decisions for a trial practitioner is whether
to try the case before a jury or the court. In some instances, court
trials have considerable advantages.4 77 However, in state court actions, a decision for a bench trial virtually guarantees that there will
be no relief on appeal, unless substantive law errors are made.4 78 Dif-

ferent appellate rules for reversible
error apply to trials before the
479
court and to trials before a jury.

473. See Xonu Intercontinental Indus. v. Staffer Chemical Co., 587 S.W.2d 757, 759
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
474. See Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Bandy Laboratories, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 484, 486
(Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
475. See Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Bandy Laboratories, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 484, 486
(Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Dabney v. Thomas, 593 S.W.2d 561, 562
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
476. See Brockette v. Sosa, 675 S.W.2d 807, 808 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ).
477. Some of the advantages that are traditionally noted are shortness of trials and the
decision of difficult issues by judges rather than jurors who might not be familiar with the
subject matter involved in the lawsuit. See generally Carlton, From Verdict to Judgment, 6
Sw. L.J. 244 (1952); Cogburn, Problems in ObtainingAppellate Review in Non-Jury Trials in
Texas, 11 S. TEx. L.J. 46 (1969); Pope, The Jury, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 426 (1961); Hewitt &
Bright, Finding of Fact: Crucial,Ignored, Often Fatal on Appeal, 46 TEx. B.J. 937 (1983).
478. See Shintech, Inc. v. Group Constr., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 144, 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.).
479. See Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1976,
writ ref d n.r.e.); Cogburn, Problems in Obtaining Appellate Review in Non-Jury Trials in
Texa, 11 S. TEx. L.J. 46, 48 (1969).
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1. Non-Jury Trial

After the trial of a non-jury case, either party may request findings
of fact and conclusions of law to support the judge's decision.4 80 The
findings of fact serve the same function as jury findings in a jury case.
The request for findings of fact and conclusions of law must be filed
within ten (10) days after the final judgment is signed, and notice of
the filing of the request must be served on all parties.481 Once demand
is made for the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court must
file them within thirty (30) days after the judgment is signed.482 However, if the court fails to file findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the requesting party, in order to preserve the error for appeal, must
notify the court in writing within five (5) days after the deadline has
run."' Thereafter, the court has another five (5) days to make its
filing.484 Once the court has filed the original findings of fact and conclusions of law, either party may request additional or amended findings or conclusions.485 Any additional filings must be made by the
486
court within five (5) days.
If findings of fact and conclusions of law are not requested and
480. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 296; see also Ratcliff v. State Bar of Texas, 673 S.W.2d 339, 341
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (request for facts and conclusions of law available to both parties).
481. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 296; see also Wallace v. Wallace, 623 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.). A premature request for findings of fact
and conclusions of law is a nullity. See Williams v. Royal American Chinchilla, Inc., 560
S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ reed n.r.e.). Until 1984, Rule 296
provided that the request for findings of fact and conclusions of law could be filed within ten
(10) days of final judgment or an order overruling a motion for new trial. See TEX. R. Civ. P.
296 (1981). This provision was removed in 1984 by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. R.
Civ. P. 296.
482. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 297; see also Wade v. Anderson, 602 S.W.2d 347, 350 (rex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1980, writ reed n.r.e.). Even though findings of fact and conclusions of law
are often prepared by the prevailing attorney, once they are filed and adopted by the court they
are attributed to the court. See Berkman v. D. M. Oberman Mfg. Co., 230 S.W. 838, 840-41
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1921, writ dism'd).
483. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 297; see also Cameron v. MacDonnell, 659 S.W.2d 911, 913
(rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 624 S.W.2d 800, 802
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ reed n.r.e.).
484. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 297.
485. See id. 298. See generally Hewitt & Bright, Findings of Fact: Crucial Ignored,
Often Fatalon Appeal 46 TEx. B.J. 937 (Aug. 1983). The request must be made within five
days of the filing date of the original findings and conclusions. See Byrd v. Smith, 590 S.W.2d
772, 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
486. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 298. The trial court's failure to file amended findings and conclusions is not automatically harmful, and the complaining party must show that the failure to
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filed, the judgment must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal
theory that has support in the evidence.487 Furthermore, all questions
of fact will be presumed to support the judgment.488 Occasionally, the
court will make findings of fact and conclusions of law in the written
judgment. Texas courts have traditionally found that these recitations of fact and law fulfill the court's obligation under Rule 296.489
On the other hand, any pronouncements made by the court after the
close of the evidence, which are not subsequently incorporated in the
written judgment, cannot be considered as findings of fact and conclusions of law. 4 ° On appeal, the trial court's findings of fact are binding
on the appellate court unless challenged by a point of error. 491 However, findings of fact are not conclusive on appeal when a full statement of facts appear in the record.492 As a result, the appellate courts
are free to test the findings of fact by the evidence in the record the
same way in which jury's answers are tested.493 Finally, courts require that findings of fact must be supported by evidence of probative
act made the judgment incorrect. See Shelby Intern, Inc. v. Wiener, 563 S.W.2d 324, 328
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
487. See Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. 1977); Raymond v. Aquarius Condominium Owner's Ass'n, 662 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); Concerned Citizens for Better Educ., Inc. v. Woodley, 623 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1981, writ dism'd).
488. See Stewart v. Clark, 677 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ); Raymond v. Aquarius Condominium Owners Ass'n, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
489. See Precipitair Pollution Control v. Green, 626 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1981, writ refd n.r.e.); Peterson v. Peterson, 595 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980, writ dism'd); Texas Constr. Group, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 663 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ dism'd). In Texas Construction, recital of facts in the
order granting a temporary injunction was held to have fulfilled the court's obligation under
Rule 296. See id. at 105.
490. See In re W. E. R., 669 S.W.2d 717, 716 (Tex. 1984); cf Jampole v. Touchy, 673
S.W.2d 569, 574 (Tex. 1984) (oral pronouncements of trial court not part of appellate record).
491. See Anderson v. Smith, 635 S.W.2d 204, 206 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982,
no writ); Wade v. Anderson, 602 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ refd
n.r.e.). In the absence of the statement of facts, findings of fact are conclusive on the appellate
court. See Texas Constr. Group, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 663 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ dism'd); Southard v. Southard, 567 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
492. See Lubbock Mortgage & Inv. Co., Inc. v. Thomas, 626 S.W.2d 611, 614 (rex.
App.-El Paso 1981, no writ); Stephenson v. Perlitz, 537 S.W.2d 287, 289 (rex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
493. See Rouver v. Dulaney, 589 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no
writ).
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value. 494

2. Jury Trial
a.

Submission of the Charge

Under Rules 271, 272, and 273, the court has the obligation to prepare, sign, and deliver a written charge to the jury in open court. 495
In this regard, any party may provide and request written instructions, special issues, and definitions to the court for its consideration.
However, contrary to popular belief, the court is free to disregard any
issues requested, and may submit any charge it deems appropriate.
However, if no issue is requested on a particular element, any complaint on appeal is waived, unless the element is conclusively established as a matter of law.496 As a result, it is important that a party
relying on an independent ground of recovery or defense submit issues
to the trial court for inclusion in the court's charge.
b.

Requests for Special Issues, Instructions, and Definitions497

The party who asserts an independent ground of recovery or defense must submit the controlling issues in substantially correct form
or any complaint on appeal for failure of the trial court to include
such issue is waived.498 In many instances, complaints are raised that
one or more crucial elements of a cause of action are not submitted to
a jury. In this event, the party who relies upon the omitted ground
must request the submission of the omitted issue or issues in substantially correct form or waive both a jury trial, and any error an appeal
on that issue.4 99 However, the party not relying on the omitted sub494. See Grimsley v. Grimsley, 632 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982,
no writ); Block v. Waters, 564 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).

495. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 271, 272, 273; see also Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Davis, 374
S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
496. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 299; see also Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. 1983);
Glens Fall Ins. Co. v. Peters, 386 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. 1965).
497. For general discussions on special issues, instructions, and definitions, see G.
HoDGEs, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS (1969).
498. See Shwiff v. Priest, 650 S.W.2d 894, 901 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ);
Powell v. Lenox Jenkins Interiors, 540 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.32.2, at 346-55
(1983) (outlining duty to submit special issues); Spradley, The Global Issue: Outlaw of the
Special Issue Practice, 18 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1980).
499. See Griffin v. Eakin, 656 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ); Moffett v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 652 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ refd
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mission may preserve error for appeal by simply objecting that the

missing element is not submitted.s"° The same rules apply to requested definitions and explanatory instructions with one important
difference. The burden to request definitions and explanatory instructions requires the submission of the definition or instruction in writing
regardless of who has the burden on the issue addressed by the definiton or instruction.

°1

The term "in substantially correct form" has given both lawyers
and courts a difficult time. As a result, a body of case law has grown
up around the practice of requesting issues, definitions, and instruc-

tions.502 When the requested issue is one of a series of independent
issues which are all essential to properly submit a theory of recovery
or defense, all of the omitted issues must be requested in substantially

correct form to preserve error.50 3 Additionally, if the requested instruction refers to a word and states that the word is "defined herein,"
and the request does not include the definition of the word, the request is not in "substantially correct form."" ° On the other hand, the

courts have not required requested issues to be perfect in order to pass
the "substantially correct form" test. 50 5 The proper test is that a requested issue cannot be substantially correct if it would have been
50 6

error to submit it over a proper objection.

n.r.e.); Garner Motors, Inc. v. Innes, 503 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972,
writ refd n.r.e.).
500. See Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Owens, 653 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1983, writ ref d n.r.e.); Thywissen v. FTI Corp., 518 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
501. See State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467, 479 (Tex. 1966); D. W. Durham v. Uvalde
Rock Asphalt Co., 599 S.W.2d 866, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ); Wilson
v. City of Port Lavaca, 407 S.W.2d 325, 331 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
502. See generally G. HODOES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS (1969); R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE §§ 12.33.1 to 12.36.7, at 348-66 (1984).

503. See Shwiff v. Priest, 650 S.W.2d 894, 901 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ);
Mata v. Albert, 548 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.); Catilleja v. Camero, 402 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966), aff'd, 414
S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967).
504. See Griffin v. Eakin, 656 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ); Holland v. Leslie, 350 S.W.2d 859, 863 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
505. See Fawcett v. Bellah, 556 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1977,
no writ); Mata v. Albert, 548 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Crutcher - Rolfs - Cummings, Inc. v. Ballard, 540 S.W.2d 380, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
506. See Armellini Exp. Lines of Florida, Inc. v. Ansley, 605 S.W.2d 297, 307 (Tex. Civ.
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Special issues, instructions, and definitions must not only be submitted in substantially correct form, but must also be submitted in
writing to the trial judge prior to the submission of the case to the
jury. 7 This requirement of written requests has proven confusing to
lawyers. As stated below, objections to the court's charge may be
submitted orally and dictated to the court reporter to preserve error.
However, the requirement of a writing for requests is absolute.508 The
reasons for these two rules is best explained in the recent supreme
court decision of Billy Woods v. Crane Carrier Co., Inc. o9 In that
decision, the plaintiff did not request an instruction in writing; instead
the plaintiff's attorney dictated the instruction to the court reporter,
along with objections to the court's charge. The plaintiff contended
that the instruction dictated to the reporter in conjunction with one of
the special issues was identical to the same instruction submitted in
writing in conjunction with another special issue. The supreme court
ruled that Rule 279 requires special issues, instructions, and definitions in writing.5"' Justice Kilgarlin stated that the reason for the rule
was that the "prolificacy of requested issues and instructions," "the
myriad of interruptions," and the "occasional confusion inherent in
the charge" mandates that requests be in writing.51 ' As Justice Kilgarlin points out, "[t]o expect a judge, after hearing oral and lengthy
requests just once, to weigh their merits for inclusion in a charge ignores realities. ' 512 Additionally, requests for issues, instructions, or
definitions should be made separately from objections to the court's
charge so3 as to avoid confusion and loss of a potential error for
51
appeal.
App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Adams v. Rhodes, 543 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ reed n.r.e.).

507. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 272; see also Stede v. Bost, 602 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1980, no writ); Colandino v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 585 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
508. See Woods v. Crane Carrier Co., Inc., 693 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. 1985).
509. 693 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1985).
510. See id.at 379.
511. See id.at 379.
512. Id.at 379.
513. See Ramirez v. Johnson, 601 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980,
writ refd n.r.e.). However, recent rulings by the supreme court have significantly diluted this
rule. See Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. 1984); Betty Leavell
Realty Co. v. Raggio, 669 S.W.2d 102, 104 (1984). In Betty Leavell Realty, the defendant
objected to the submission of one issue specifically, and thereafter opposed an alternative issue
that would cure the objection. The supreme court ruled that the judge, as well as the opposing
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c. Objections to the Court's Charge
After the charge is prepared, but before it is delivered to the jury,
the judge must give the parties an opportunity to examine and present
objections to the court's charge. 514 In fact, a refusal to give reasonable time to make objections to the charge may be reversible error. 51 5
Unlike requests for special issues, instructions, and definitions, objections to the court's charge may not only be made in writing, but may
be dictated to the court reporter in the presence of the judge and opposing counsel prior to submission of the charge to the jury. 16 However, it is important to note that objections dictated in the absence of
the judge do not preserve error for appeal, as those objections do not
give the court an opportunity to change the charge before submission
to the jury.5 17 Failure to file a timely objection to the submission of
special issues, definitions, and instructions precludes review of the
submission of the charge on those particulars on appeal.518 In some
instances, the parties have agreed to delay their objections to the
court's charge until after the case has been submitted to the jury.
This practice, although done by agreement and even with consent and
approval of the court, violates Rule 272 and preserves no error on
519
appeal.
party, understood the nature of the objection, and refused to amend the special issue to cure
the stated objection. As a result the supreme court found that the court's failure to change the
issue constituted a ruling. See id. at 104. The supreme court did not object to the practice of
putting submissions in the same list as objections. See id. at 104.
514. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 272.
515. See Standard Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Kirk, 465 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 475 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1972). If the court
does not allow sufficient time to make appropriate objections, the attorney, in order to preserve
error, should state that he has not had an opportunity to sufficiently review the court's charge.
If particular problems are apparent in the court's charge, those should be identified, and the
request for additional time should indicate the precise amount of time given by the court for
review. If the court refuses to allow additional time, a bystander's bill may be prepared complaining of the court's actions. See id. at 773.
516. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Burton, 618 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.); 5 W. DoRsANEo, TEXAs LMGATION GUIDE § 122.05[2]
(1985).
517. See McDonald v. New York Central Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 380 S.W.2d 545, 547 (rex.
1964); Brantley v. Sprague, 636 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ rerd
n.r.e.).
518. See Brown v. American Transfer and Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1980);
Ruffv. Christian Services of the Southwest, 627 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Hall v. Rodgers, 620 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
519. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. 1973); Suddeth v.
Howard, 560 S.W.2d 514, 515-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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It is well settled that a general and vague objection to the charge
preserves no error.520 Courts have devised a simple test for deciding
whether the objection has the required specificity. The test is whether
the objection causes the court to become fully cognizant of the ground
of the actual complaint. 21 Likewise, if an objection is obscured or
concealed by voluminous unfounded
objections or stock objections,
522
error will be waived on appeal.

Prior to 1984, failing to obtain the court's express ruling on an objection to the court's charge waived the right to complain of such
ruling on appeal. 523 This rule lead to absurd results, as in many instances, trial judges would not rule on objections to the court's charge
even when pressed by counsel. As a result, there would be no express
ruling in the record from which to appeal. 524 In 1984 the supreme
court overruled several decades of cases and held in Acord v. General
Motors Corp.,525 "if an objection is articulated and the trial court
makes no change in the charge, the objection is, of necessity, overruled. ' 526 Within two months of the Acord decision, the court en520. See Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 41, 42 (Nov. 9,
1985); Monsanto Co. v. Milam, 494 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. 1973); Bellefonte Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 574 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ). In
Bellefonte an objection was made to an instruction on the basis that it, "gives a totally incorrect legal test." Id. at 574. The Houston Court of Appeals ruled that these objections were
"totally inadequate" to preserve error. See id. at 574. In Aero Energy the supreme court
recently stated:
'[a] party objecting to a charge must point out distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the grounds of his objection."
Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 29 Tex Sup. Ct. J. 41, 42 (Nov. 9 1985).
521. See Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 29 Tex Sup. Ct. J. 41, 42 (Nov. 9
1985); Davis v. Campbell, 572 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. 1978); Citizens State Bank of Dickinson
v. Bowles, 663 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd); Mowery
v. Fantastics Homes, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).

522. See Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 574 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ). The Houston Court of Appeals in Bellefonte ruled,
"[h]ere and throughout its brief, Bellefonte has failed to meet either the requirements or spirit
of Rules 272 and 274 by clogging its exceptions and objections to the charge with non-meritorious, overused, and inapplicable stock objections. Error, if any, has been waived .. " Id. at
574.
523. See Hernandez v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 652 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1983); Lone
Star Steel Co. v. Wahl, 636 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ).
524. Eg., Moppit v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 652 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Tex. App.Austin 1982, no writ).
525. 669 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1984).
526. Id. at 114. The Acord decision overruled the holdings in Hernandez v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 652 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1983) and Cogburg v. Harbour, 657 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.
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tered another opinion which bolstered its new rule. In Betty Leavell
Realty Co. v. Raggio,527 the court held that once the defendant objected to the submission of an issue specifically and clearly, the court's
refusal to amend the charge indicated that the objection was overruled, despite the fact that no formal ruling appeared in the record. 28
The supreme court noted that the judge, as well as plaintiff's counsel,
understood the nature of the objection so that the presumption was
logical and reasonable. 529 .
Objections to the court's charge can be brought because of a variance between the pleadings and proof in the case. Any objections regarding a variance must be specific and point directly to the variance
between the proof, pleading, and the requested charge.53° Objections
on the grounds of variance are not favored by the court, and the objections will be overruled if the pleadings give the opponent sufficient
notice and opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.5 31 Normally,
variance is not harmful error. To be reversible, the variance must be
substantial, misleading, and prejudicial. 32
d. Deemed Findings
Rule 279 contains a trap for the unwary. Rule 279 provides that
when a ground of recovery or defense consists of more than one element, and one or more of those elements are submitted through special issues that are necessarily referable to omitted elements, the court
may deem the elements found in favor of the judgment.5 33 In order
for the court to deem these findings, the court must find that there
was no objection to, or request for the omitted issues, and may only
entertain a motion to deem on the request of a party after notice and
1983), to the extent they conflict with Acord. See Acord v. General Motors, Inc., 669 S.W.2d
111, 114 (Tex. 1984).
527. 669 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1984).
528. See id. at 104.

529. See id. at 104.
530. See Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 924 (rex. 1981); Fruehauf Corp. v.
Ortega, 687 S.W.2d 777, 782 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
531. See Murray v. 0 & A Express, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. 1982); Fruehauf
Corp. v. Ortega, 687 S.W.2d 777, 782 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).

532. See Brown v. American Transfer and Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 937 (rex. 1980);
Siebenlist v. Harville, 596 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tex. 1980); Hersh v. Hendley, 626 S.W.2d 151,
154 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
533. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 279; see also Williams v. Northrup, 649 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1983, writ refd n.r.e.); Hoffman v. Wall, 602 S.W.2d 324, 327 (rex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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hearing.5 34 The purpose of the "necessarily referable" requirement of
Rule 279 is to give the parties, against whom the issues may be
deemed, fair notice of a partial submission of issues so those parties
will have an opportunity to object to the failure to submit all of the
necessary issues to a ground of recovery or defense.5 3 As a result, if
issues are submitted that are "necessarily referable" to omitted issues,
the opposing party must object to the failure to include the omitted
issues, or waive any later complaint if the court, in its 36
discretion,
judgment.the
of
favor
in
found
issues
deems the omitted
e.

Form of Submission

Under Rule 277 the method of submission of the case to the jury is
within the discretion of the trial court. 537 However, there is increasing pressure from the Texas Supreme Court for the broad submission
of special issues.5 38 In fact, former Chief Justice Jack Pope indicated
in a recent article that, "issues for the jury may, and ought to be,
asked broadly. 51

39

At this writing, there is some indication that the

supreme court will revise Rules 272 thru 279 to provide a mandatory
broad form of submission of issues, but as yet no changes have been
made.
f. Jury Argument
Rule 269 sets forth the parameters of jury argument.3° The trial
court is vested with broad discretion in fixing the time allowable for
oral argument, and that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in
534. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 279; see also Pinnacle Homes, Inc. v. R. C. L. Offshore Eng'g
Co., 640 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
535. See G. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS 97 (1959).
536. See Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Allen, 664 S.W.2d 136, 144-45 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
537. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; see also Jacobs v. Jacobs, 670 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1984, writ refd n.r.e.). See generally Comment, Scope of SpecialIssues in
Negligence Cases: Pleadings, Proof and Rule 277, 15 Hous. L. REv. 735 (1978).
538. See Alvarez v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co., 683 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1985);
Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. 1984); Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 572 S.W.2d 273, 275 (rex. 1978); Mobile Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.
1974). See generally Spradley, Global Issue: Outlaw of the Special Issue Practice, 18 Hous. L.
REV. 1 (1980).
539. Pope, The State of the Special Verdict, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 3 (1979).
540. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 269(b)-(h); see also E. Cox, MANUAL ON JURY ARGUMENT IN
TEXAS COURTS 75-84 (1947) (detailing types of improper jury arguments).
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the absence of demonstrated injury to the complaining party.5 4 1 To

properly preserve any error for failing to give additional time during
jury argument, the complaining party must show a request for the
additional time, the court's refusal, and a demonstration that the refusal probably caused a rendition of an improper verdict.54 2
Most jury argument reversals are caused by improper jury argu-

ment.543 As a result, jury argument should always be recorded 5"4 to

provide an adequate record to substantiate the harm of improper jury

argument. 545 Generally, attorneys are permitted wide latitude in discussing both the facts and issues during jury argument. 46 Rule
269(e), however, specifically states that only arguments confined to
the evidence and arguments of opposing counsel are permissible.54 7
Subsections (e) and (f) of Rule 269 prevent personal criticism between
trial attorneys, sidebar remarks, and remarks by counsel when the
other attorney is addressing the court or jury. 54 8 The party with the
burden of proof on the whole case under the pleadings or on the issues
5 49
submitted to the jury has a right to open and close the argument.

However, if the right to open and close the argument is improperly
541. See Aultman v. Dallas Ry. & Ter. Co., 152 Tex. 509, 512, 260 S.W.2d 596, 600
(1953); Montes v. Lazzara Shipyard, 657 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. App.---Corpus Christi 1983,
no writ); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Shiffert, 593 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
542. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Shiffert, 593 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); South Texas Nat. Gas Gathering Co. v. Guerra, 469 S.W.2d 899,
912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pirrung v. T. & N. 0. Ry. Co.,
350 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, no writ).
543. See generally Burleson, Voir Dire, Trial Tactics, and Jury Argument-Putting Flesh
on the Bones of A Lawsuit, 17 TRIAL LAW. F. 2 (1983); Crump, Effective Jury Argument: The
Organization, 43 TEX. B.J. 468 (1980).
544. Reporters, however, do not usually record the argument unless specifically requested
to do so by the attorneys. If a request is made, the court reporter does have a duty to record
the argument. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 376. If the argument is not recorded, a bill of exception is
necessary to preserve the error for appeal. See id. 372.
545. See Queen City Land Co. v. State, 601 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Zamora v. Romero, 581 S.W.2d 742, 750 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus
Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
546. See Zamora v. Romero, 581 S.W.2d 742, 750 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Crump, Effective Jury Argument: The Organization, 43 TEx.
B.J. 468, 469 (1983).
547. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 269(e); see also Dover Corp. v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 761, 767
(Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
548. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 269(e), (f); see also Middleton v. Palmer, 601 S.W.2d 759, 763
(rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally 5 W. DORSANEO, TExAs LmGATION GUIDE § 120C.03 (1985) (detailing types of improper jury arguments).
549. See Walker v. Money, 132 Tex. 132, 135, 120 S.W.2d 428, 431 (1938); see also Hor-
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decided by the court, the appellant must show that the denial was
calculated to, and probably did, cause the rendition of an improper
judgment 5 °
Improper jury argument is generally categorized as being curable
" ' If the argument is "curable," the party must
or incurable.55
5 52
promptly object, or any error in the argument is waived on appeal.
If, on the other hand, the argument is "incurable," no objection is
needed to preserve error on appeal. 55 3 The test as to whether the argument is incurable is whether the prejudice of the argument can be
eliminated by an instruction to the jury to disregard the improper argument. 554 The test for reversal for improper jury argument is
roughly the same. If the argument, considered in its proper setting,
was reasonably calculated to cause prejudice to the opposing side, and
an instruction by the court or withdrawal of the argument by counsel
could not eliminate the probability of prejudice, the case should be
reversed. 555 In making the determination, the appellate court will review the entire record to determine whether the comment caused the
rendition of an improper verdict. 56
ton v. Dental Capital Leasing Corp., 649 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, no

writ).
550. See Horton v. Dental Capital Leasing Corp., 649 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1983, no writ); Francis v. Stanley, 574 S.W.2d 629, 631 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, no writ).
551. See Otis Elevator v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 333 (Tex. 1968); Howard v. Faberge,
Inc., 679 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
552. See Houston Light & Power Co. v. Fisher, 559 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 857
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.). The objection to a curable jury argument must be ruled upon by the court for error to be preserved for appellate review. See Duke
v. Power Elec. & Hardware Co., 674 S.W.2d 400, 405 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Peyson, 373 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, no

writ).
553. See Otis Elevator v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 333 (Tex. 1968); Howard v. Faberge,
Inc., 679 S.W.2d 644, 649 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ). While no objection
to incurable jury arguments is required, Rule 324 requires that if the court does not have an
opportunity to rule on the improper jury argument the objection to the argument should be
included in the motion for new trial so error will be preserved. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 324; 5 W.
DORsANEO, TExAS LmGATION GUIDE § 120C.04[2] (1965).

554. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Coranado, 628 S.W.2d 818, 823 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 582 S.W.2d 521, 529 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
555. See Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Tex. 1964); Howard v. Faberge,
Inc., 679 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ); Magic Chef, Inc. v.
Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
556. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839-40 (Tex. 1979). The
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Jury Deliberations

Error can arise in a trial even after the case is submitted to the jury.
It is the responsibility of the judge, bailiff, and all attorneys in the case
to check materials that are sent to the jury room. 557 The court is
required to send all exhibits admitted into evidence into the jury during deliberations"I since Rule 281 "is self-operative, and requires no
requests from the jurors or counsel."' 5 59 However, in the event that
exhibits are not sent to the jury room, the harmless error rule applies,
and the error must be such as was reasonably calculated to, and probably did, cause rendition of an improper judgment in the case."W
Occasionally, problems arise because improper documents are delivered to the jury room. In one case, a copy of the court's charge
with notations by the appellee's lawyer was mistakenly delivered to
the jury room.5 61 The notations had been made for the purpose of
aiding the appellee's lawyer in his argument to the jury. 6 2 The court
refused to reverse the jury's verdict, noting that it was the duty of the
judge, baiiff, and all lawyers to ensure that the correct exhibits were
sent to the jury room. 563 However, in another case where the blanks
in the special issues were completely filled in by the appellee's attorney and mistakenly delivered to the jury room, the court of appeals
56
had no difficulty in reversing the case on jury misconduct grounds. "
The jury may communicate with the court by notifying the bailiff,
who shall inform the judge of the request. Thereafter, the jury may
communicate only with the court.5 65 The means of communication
are with the judge orally in open court or by written communication

supreme court stressed in Standard Fire that courts should avoid expanding the category of
incurable jury argument and should rely on corrective instructions to avoid unnecessary prejudice. See id. at 839-40.
557. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 281; see also City of Houston v. Simon, 580 S.W.2d 667, 668
(Tex.Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
558. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 281.
559. First Employees Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 646 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1983).
560. See id. at 172.
561. See City of Houston v. Simon, 580 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, no writ).
562. See id. at 668.
563. See id. at 668-70.
564. See Sidrain v. Western Textile Prod. Co., 258 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas), rev'd on other grounds, 152 Tex. 21, 262 S.W.2d 942 (1954).
565. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 285.
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between the judge and the jurors. 566 In the case of written correspondence between the judge and the jury, care should be taken that the
notes are placed in the record and are initialed by the judge so that
they may be included in the transcript.5 67 In many instances, the
jury's notes will indicate what evidence had an effect on them, and the
notes are valuable in demonstrating that error was either harmless or
reversible error.
The jury may request that the statement of any witness be read to
them on a certain point in dispute.5 61 If a request is made and the
jury recites that there is a conflict among the jurors on the substance
of the testimony, the court must read the evidence back to the jury.569
The court, however, has great discretion in deciding what part of the
testimony can be read to jurors. 570 It is the court's duty to discover
what parts of the evidence are the source of the conflict. The court
does not err in refusing to read back testimony where the juror's request is nothing more than a request for rereading practically all the
71
testimony of certain witnesses.
Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Evidence and the revised Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, the scope of jury misconduct has been substantially limited, and a juror may only testify to whether outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.5 72 Due to the
infancy of these new rules, which abolish testimony concerning most
jury misconduct, no court has determined how broad the term
"outside influence" should be. For example, can a juror's statement
be an outside influence, or must others communicate with a juror
from outside the courtroom? The party seeking the new trial has the
burden of proving that an act of misconduct occurred, that it was
material, and that the misconduct injured the movant such that it
566. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 285, 286; see also Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 159 (Tex.

Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
567. See George Pharis Chevrolet, Inc. v. Polk, 661 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. App.-Hous-

ton [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
568. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 287.
569. See Steinburger v. Archer County, 621 S.W.2d 838, 843-44 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1981, no writ).
570. See Wirtz v. Orr, 575 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana

1978, writ

dism'd).
571. See Hill v. Roberson, 592 S.W.2d 376, 383-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ

ref'd n.r.e.).
572. See TEX. R. EVID. 606(b); see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 327(b). See generally Boyd, Jury
Misconduct Claims in Texas Civil Cases, 21 S. TEX. L.J. 23 (1980).
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caused the rendition of an improper judgment." 3
IV.
A.

POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

After a verdict is returned, the court may render a judgment
574
notwithstanding the verdict upon motion and reasonable notice.
The standard for granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
whether a directed verdict after the close of the evidence would have
been proper. 575 In most instances, motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are entered when special issue findings appear to
have no support in the evidence.5 76 In this regard, the court must
determine that there is no evidence of probative value upon which the
jury could have based their findings to the special issues. 5 7 7 In reviewing the record, all evidence must be considered in the light most
favorable to the party in whose favor the jury verdict has been rendered, and every inference arising from that evidence is to be drawn in
that party's favor.5 78 If the trial or appellate court finds that the jury's
answers to special issues have any support in the evidence, a judgment
573. See Keltner, Jury Misconduct in Texas: Trying The Tryer of Fact, 34 Sw. L.J. 1131
(1981); see also Strange v. Treasure City, 608 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. 1980); Bufkin v. Texas
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 658 S.W.2d 317, 322 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
574. See TEx. R. CIv. P. 301. See generally Note, Civil Procedure-JudgmentNon Obstante Verdicto, 49 TExAs L. REv. 332, 334-37 (1971) (discussing general requirements of
judgment notwithstanding verdict).
575. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 301; see also, Dodd v. Texas Form Prods. Co., 576 S.W.2d 812,
815 (Tex. 1979); Moore v. Reed, 668 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ);
Rowland v. City of Corpus Christi, 620 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
576. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 301; see also Douglass v. Panama, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 776, 777-78
(Tex. 1974) (jury's answer on contract expectations not supported by any evidence, therefore,
properly disregarded); Carr v. Galvan, 650 S.W.2d 864, 868 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984,
writ refd n.r.e.) (special issue answers were unsupported by evidence, judgment n.o.v. proper).
577. See Williams v. Meyer, 629 S.W.2d 257, 259-60 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ
dism'd); Del Monte Corp. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ); Hill v. W. E. Brittain, Inc., 405 S.W.2d 803, 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1966, no writ). Rule 301 does not require "no evidence at all" but only that the evidence lacks
legal sufficiency to support the special issue answer. See Burt v. Lochausen, 152 Tex. 289, 291,
294 S.W.2d 194, 199 (1952); TM Prods., Inc. v. Nichols, 542 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
578. See Dodd v. Texas Farm Prods. Co., 576 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex. 1979); Douglass v.
Panama, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex. 1974); Marquez v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 625 S.W.2d
52, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 628 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.
1982).
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notwithstanding the verdict is not permissible, and must be reversed
on appeal.5 79 The motion may be filed any time after the judgment is
entered, but before the judgment becomes final. 58 0 A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not have the same specificity
requirement of a Rule 268 motion for directed verdict. 51 However, a
motion should have a statement of the jury findings attached and
should specify the reasons that the jury findings should be ignored. 2
There appears to be no prerequisite in the rules of procedure for raising a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in fact, a
party that has previously requested a special issue may claim that the
answer is not supported by the evidence in a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.58 a
Some appellate review problems have arisen with motions for judg579. See Williams v. Meyer, 629 S.W.2d 257, 259-60 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ
dism'd); Fiderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., Inc., 583 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
no writ); Brownsville & Matamorous Bridge Co. v. Null, 578 S.W.2d 774, 778 (rex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
580. See Needville Indep. School Dist. v. Stjst Resthome, 566 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins., 509 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
time period to file a motion for new trial is not tolled by filing a motion for judgment n.o.v. See
Walker v. S & T Truck Lines, Inc., 409 S.W.2d 942, 943-46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1967, writ ref'd).
581. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 301 ("upon motion and reasonable notice the court may
render judgment non obstante verdicto") with id. 268 ("motion for directed verdict shall state
the specific grounds therefor.")
582. See Dittderner v. Bell, 558 S.W.2d 527, 531-32 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarllo 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf Olin Corp. v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (without motion non obstante verdicto trial court cannot
deny party judgment on verdict).
583. See Morris v. Transp. Ins. Co., 487 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Jackson v. Dallas, 443 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1969) (motion for directed verdict is not required for motion for judgment n.o.v.), rev'd
on other grounds, 450 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1970). In federal court, however, a motion for directed
verdict is a necessary prerequisite to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Furthermore, a party may not assert a ground in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict that was not included in a motion for directed verdict. See
id. 50(b); see also United States Indus. v. Brock Constr. Co., 671 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Meyers v. Moody, 475 F. Supp. 232, 235 (N.D. Tex. 1979). There are also other differences between a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in federal court and one in state court.
For example, in federal court, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be filed
no later than ten (10) days after the entry of judgment and may be joined with a motion for
new trial. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (ten day limitation for motion for judgment n.o.v.)
with Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 509 S.W.2d 387,
392 (rex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no limitation on time for motion
n.o.v. except before judgment is final).
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ment notwithstanding the verdict which were filed with a motion for
new trial. In order to preserve the right to appeal the denial of a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, that motion must
be acted
upon prior to the trial court's ruling on a motion for new
4
8

trial.5

The standard of review on appeal is strict. In reviewing a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court must indulge all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the jury findings, and
must determine whether the evidence as a matter of law required a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.5"' 586
All other evidence and inignored.
be
must
contrary
the
to
ferences
The trial court is without power to render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on its own motion.58 7 As a result, it is necessary
to consider making a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to perfect the record for appeal. If the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is overruled, the movant may proceed directly to appeal without the necessity of filing a motion for new
trial. 18 However, if the motion is granted, the respondent should
bring forth any cross-points it wishes to appeal by a motion for new
trial.5 89 A failure to take this precaution may waive any right to complain on appeal. 90
584. See Diaz v. Deavers, 574 S.W.2d 602, 603-04 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ
dism'd); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 509 S.W.2d
387, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hann v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,
312 S.W.2d 261, 263 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ).
585. See Coffee v. F. W. Woolworth, 536 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. 1976); Douglass v. Panama, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 776, 777 (rex. 1974); Anderson v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 623
S.W.2d 162, 163 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
586. See Williams v. Bennett, 610 S.W.2d 144, 145 (rex. 1981). See generally W. DORSANEO, TExAS LMGAToN GUIDE § 130.03 (1985) (outlining proper appellate review standard for motion for judgment n.o.v.).
587. See Jacksboro Nat'l Bank v. City Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 592 S.W.2d 672, 675
(rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979), rev'd on othergrounds, 602 S.W.2d 511 (rex. 1980); Reed
v. Enright, 488 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ).
588. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 324; see also City of San Antonio v. Theis, 554 S.W.2d 278, 282
(rex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 807 (1978).
589. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 324(c); see also Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Central
Bank of Houston, 672 S.W.2d 641, 644 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ);
Western Constr. Co. v. Valero Transmission Co., 655 S.W.2d 251, 255 (rex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1983, no writ); Stevenson v. Adams, 640 S.W.2d 681, 683 (rex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
590. See Shrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534, 541 (rex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,

writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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B. Motion for New Trial
1. Purpose

Generally, a motion for new trial is the last chance to convince the
trial court that error has occurred, causing the rendition of an improper judgment.591 In 1981 and 1984, the rules regarding motions
for new trial were revised, creating some traps for the unwary trial
practitioner.- 92 In 1981 Rule 324 was amended to remove the presumption that most points of error must first be presented to the trial
court in a motion for new trial as a prerequisite for appeal.593 In 1984
an amendment to Rule 324 created specific exceptions to the general
rule of no requirement of motion for new trial.594 Generally, a motion
for new trial is still a prerequisite to an appeal for matters which have
not otherwise been brought to the court's attention or for which additional evidence is needed. 59 5 The obvious purpose of a motion for new

trial is to provide the trial court an opportunity to re-examine any
specific error.5 96 By requiring the movant to present the complaint in
clear and understandable language, the trial judge may have a full
591. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 320; see also Mushinski v. Mushinski, 621 S.W.2d 669, 671
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ) (motion for new trial is means to correct error, not
attempt to try case differently); Townsend v. Collard, 575 S.W.2d 422, 423-24 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ) (motion for new trial meant to cure only errors already
made).
592. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 320, 324, 329b.
593. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 324 (1981). The 1981 rule provided, "a motion for new trial
shall not be a prerequisite to the right to complain on appeal, in any jury or non-jury case."
Id. 324. The purpose behind the 1981 amendment was to abolish the "useless formality" of a
motion for new trial in most circumstances. See Guittard, Other Significant Changes in the
Appellate Rules, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 667, 679 (1981).

594. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 324 ("point in a motion for new trial is not a prerequisite to a
complaint on appeal in either a jury or non-jury case, except as provided in subsection (b)")
(emphasis added).
595. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b). Subdivision (b) enumerates the grounds for which a
motion for new trial is still a prerequisite for appeal. These include the following:
1. A complaint on which evidence must be heard such as one of jury misconduct or
newly discovered evidence or failure to set aside a judgment by default;
2. A complaint of factual insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding;
3. A complaint that a jury finding is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence;
4. A complaint of inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages found by the jury; or
5. Incurable jury argument if not otherwise ruled on by the trial court.
Id 324(b).
596. See Townsend v. Collard, 575 S.W.2d 422, 423-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1978, no writ). See generally Barrow, Appellate ProcedureReform, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 615,
618 (1981).
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opportunity to correct errors or to grant a new trial. 97 A substantial

amount of case law has developed around the practice involved in
motions for new trials. At the outset, the rules of procedure provide
an immense amount of unchecked power to the trial court in this
area. For example, the granting of a motion for new trial is not re-

viewable on appeal.5 9 Additionally, appellate courts will not issue a
writ of mandamus directing a trial judge to set aside the granting of a

motion for new trial5 99 except in two isolated situations. The first is
when the order granting a new trial is issued after the trial court's

jurisdiction in the case ends. 6°° The second is when the motion is
granted because of a conflict in the jury's answers to special issues. 6 0
Obviously, motions for new trial may be filed on any number of
grounds, including jury misconduct, newly-discovered evidence, ex-

cessive or insufficient verdicts, insufficiency of evidence, motions to set
aside default judgments, and the like. This article will not discuss the
peculiarities of each type of motion, but will address the problems
applicable to all motions for new trial.
2.

Form

The rules of procedure do not dictate a particular form for the motion for new trial." 2 However, several items are clear. First, all motions for new trial must be in writing and signed by the party or the
trial attorney. 603 There is no general rule on how detailed the grounds
597. See Smith v. Brock, 514 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no

writ).
598. See A. C. Grohn v. Marquardt, 657 S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fenno v. Sam Reece Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 572 S.W.2d
810, 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ); Napier v. Napier, 567 S.W.2d
851, 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1977, no writ).
599. See Johnson v. Court of Appeals, 162 Tex. 613, 615, 350 S.W.2d 330, 331 (1961);

Maupin Constr. Co. v. Stovall, 647 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no
writ); City of Perryton v. Boyer, 423 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, man.
over'd).
600. See Thursby v. Stovall, 647 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1983); Clark & Co. v. Giles, 639
S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); Broussard v. Dunn, 568 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Tex. 1978).
601. See Johnson v. Court of Appeals, 162 Tex. 613, 615, 350 S.W.2d 330, 331 (1961);
Rod Ric Corp. v. Barney, 651 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1983, no writ); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Smith, 539 S.W.2d 234, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1976, no writ).
602. For a proposed form of a motion for new trial, see 6 W. DoRsmANo, TEXAS LrIGATION GUIDE § 18.07.1, at 291 (1984).

603. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 320. A failure to sign the motion, however, is a mere irregularity, and is generally not fatal, especially if the motion is subsequently signed by order of the
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in the motion must be.60 Rule 321 states that each point in the motion must refer to the ruling of the court, "in such a way that the
point of objection can be clearly identified and understood."6 5 Furthermore, Rule 322 makes it clear that objections cast in general
terms shall not be considered by the court.60 6 In fact, courts have
refused to consider grounds in motions for new trial which were too
general and have also held that general grounds provide no basis for
07
6

appeal.

As a general rule, there is no necessity for verification of a motion
for new trial or for affidavits to buttress the testimony. 60 8 However,
when errors are complained of that occur outside of the proceedings,
such as in the pre-trial proceedings, a verified record needs to be
presented to the judge for consideration on the motion for new
trial. 9
3. Time Periods
The motion for new trial must be filed within thirty (30) days after
court. See Turnbow Petroleum Corp. v. Fulton, 145 Tex. 56, 58, 194 S.W.2d 256, 257-58
(1946).
604. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 322 ("generality is to be avoided"). See generally W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LImGATION GUIDE § 140.100(b)(1985); R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 18.07.1, at 291 (1984).

605. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 321. Merely incorporating previous objections from a motion
for directed verdict or motion notwithstanding the verdict is insufficient to establish a ground
of error. See Wagner v. Foster, 161 Tex. 333, 336, 341 S.W.2d 887, 891 (1960); L. F. Bauer v.
Valley Bank of El Paso, 560 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
606. See TEx. R. CIv. P. 322; cf Biggers v. Continental Bus. Sys., 157 Tex. 351, 353, 303
S.W.2d 359, 368 (1957) (setting out points of error in separate paragraphs sufficient to overcome prohibition of generality).
607. See Gavrell v. Young, 407 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Morrow v. Flores, 225 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). Appellate courts, however, tend to resolve any reasonable doubt in specificity so
as to favor considering a point of error. See In re T.B.S., 601 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); McCarthy v. Jerperson, 527 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1975, writ ref'd); R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 18.07.1, at 292 (1984).
608. See Abercia v. First Nat'l Bank of San Antonio, 500 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ); R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 18.07.2, at 296

(1984).
609. See S.B. & T. Gem Imports, Inc. v. Creswell, 671 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ); Abercia v. First Nat'l Bank of San Antonio, 500 S.W.2d
573, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ); Empire Life and Hosp. Ins. Co. v.
Poole, 469 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ). For a good discussion of
when affidavits and verifications are needed, see R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE

§ 18.07.2, at 296-302 (1984).
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the judgment or other order complained of is signed. 6 10 This time
period is almost absolute6 11 since Rule 5 prevents the trial court from

enlarging time periods "for taking any action under rules relating to
new trials" 612 except in a limited situation.6 3 Likewise, the filing of
other intervening motions does not prevent the appellate time period
from running. 614 Any motion for new trial filed more than thirty (30)

days after the judgment or order is signed is void and preserves no
rights for appeal. 615' The trial court may not alter or strike out the
date on which a judgment is signed to prevent the running of the
thirty-day period.61 6

An amended motion for new trial can be filed without leave of
court within the original thirty-day period after the judgment or order
is signed. 617 After this period of time, the court may entertain an
amended motion for new trial if it is filed during the time in which the

610. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(a); see also Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 808
(Tex.1983) (motion for new trial must be filed within thirty days).
611. See McCormack v. Guillot, 597 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. 1980); Farrow v. Bramble,
663 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); Atkinson v. Culver, 589 S.W.2d
164, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ). Rule 4 offers a limited extension of the
timetable by recognizing that legal holidays are not counted in the time period for a motion for
new trial. See TEx R. Civ. P. 4.
612. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 5; see also Lind v. Gresham, 672 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (attempt to use Rule 5 to allow untimely motion for new
trial is void); Smith v. Caney Creek Estates Club, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (Rule 5 cannot extend timetables).
613. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 5. Rule 5 allows a party to mail a motion for new trial to the
court by first class, United States mail, in a properly addressed and stamped envelope, provided the envelope is deposited in the mail at least one or more days before the date for filing.
See i 5. If the party meets and can prove all of Rule 5's requirements, the motion will be
accepted if it reaches the court within ten (10) days of its due date. See id. 5; see also Hodges v.
Texas, 539 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ) (party must establish
compliance with Rule 5's "mail-in" provision by producing the postmarked envelope or by
affidavit).
614. See Walker v. S & T Truck Lines, 409 S.W.2d 942, 943-44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1966, error refd) (motion for judgment n.o.v. had no effect in suspending time period
for motion for new trial).
615. See Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983); Farrow v. Farrow,
663 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ reed n.r.e.); Morris v. Morris, 615
S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ refd n.r.e.); R. McDONALD, TEXAS
CIVIL PRACTICE § 18.06.2, at 287 (1984).
616. See Stephens v. Henry S. Miller Co., 667 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984,
no writ); cf Reynolds v. Harrison, 635 S.W.2d 845, 84647 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, writ refd
n.r.e.) (trial court cannot extend time tables for appeals).
617. See TEx. R. Crv. P. 329b(b); see also Airco, Inc. v. Tijerina, 603 S.W.2d 785, 786
(Tex.1980).
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court has plenary power over its judgment. 618 However, the filing of
the amended motion does not operate to extend the court's jurisdiction over the judgment for any longer period than the filing of the
original motion. 6 ' 9 The effect of a late-filed amended motion actually
620
depends for its effect upon the attitude and actions of the court.

If

the trial court takes no action on the motion, the motion preserves no
error for appeal, and does not serve as a prerequisite for any of the
items in Rule 324(b). 621 Even so, the court is still free to exercise its
plenary power to set aside the initial judgment.622
Any motion for new trial, whether original or amended, is overruled by operation of law after the passage of seventy-five (75) days
after the judgment was signed. 623 This automatic rule takes effect624
if
no written order is entered within the seventy-five (75) day period.
As a result, there is no provision for extension of the seventy-five (75)
day period, and any attempts to extend this period are considered a
nullity. 625 However, the court does retain plenary power to enter additional orders after the motion for new trial is overruled by operation
of law. 626 Under Rule 329b(e) the court has plenary power until
thirty (30) days after all timely-fied motions for new trial are over-

618. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c); see also In re F. F., 636 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
619. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e); see also Airco, Inc. v. Tijerina, 603 S.W.2d 785, 786
(Tex. 1980).
620. See 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 18.06.2, at 287 (1984).
621. See id. at 287.
622. See id. at 287; see also Stephens v. Henry S. Miller Co., 667 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
623. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c); see also Clark & Co. v. Giles, 639 S.W.2d 449, 450
(Tex. 1982) (no trial court action in writing ruling on motion; motion is overruled on 75th
day).
624. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 329b(c); see also Taack v. McFall, 661 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex.
1983) (no written ruling on motion for new trial by 75th day, later ruling on motion is void).
625. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 5, 329b; see also Taack v. McFall, 661 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex.
1983). When the seventy-fifth (75) day falls on Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, the motion for new trial is not overruled by operation of law until the next day following these special
days. See Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. v. Chesher, 354 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 4 (holidays and weekends not
counted in computing time periods).
626. See Anderson v. Anderson, 575 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no
writ); Mapus v. Garza, 508 S.W.2d 857, 858 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). For a discussion on the plenary power of Texas trial courts, see Peeples, Trial Court
Jurisdiction and Control Over Judgment% 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 367 (1986).
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ruled.6 27 As a result, the trial court has the power to vacate, modify,
correct, or reform the judgment or to grant a new trial within one
hundred and five (105) days from the date of the signing of the judgment.628 If it is the court's intention to actually grant a new trial, the
court must do so in writing before the passage of one hundred and five
(105) days, or forever lose jurisdiction to take any action whatsoever. 629 If the court grants a new trial, it retains jurisdiction only for
the original seventy-five (75) day period.6 a°
V.

CONCLUSION

Protection of the record for appeal can be a tedious process, requiring strategic planning and split second decisions. However, the dividends are high. A record that is properly protected will preserve
favorable judgments and provide a good basis for the overturning of
unfavorable results.
It is obvious from the various subsections in this article that common threads in protecting the record exist within almost all of the
procedural stages of a trial. As a result, trial practitioners should remember that, with few exceptions, an appellant must demonstrate
four items to secure favorable results:
(1) Request: A party must show that the trial court was requested to take certain action or to refrain from taking action.
(2) Refusal: The record must demonstrate that the trial court refused to grant the request.
(3) Error: Legal authority must demonstrate that the trial court's
action was incorrect.
(4) Harm: Rule 434 requires a showing that the trial court's refusal probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. This
fourth step is the one most overlooked by practitioners, and as a re627. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e); see also Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex.
1978).
628. See Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three Bears, Inc., 567 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex.
1978); Garza v. Serrato, 671 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); Meso
Agro v. R. C. Dave & Sons, 584 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
629. See Taack v. McFall, 661 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1983); Boris v. Boris, 642 S.W.2d
855, 857 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
630. See Fulton v. Firch, 162 Tex. 351, 353, 346 S.W.2d 823, 825 (1961); Ranger Ins. Co.
v. Robertson, 680 S.W.2d 618, 620-21 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984), aff'd in part & rev'd in pap%
689 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. 1985).
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suit, numerous appellate opinions admit that the trial court committed error, but refuse to find that the error was harmful. In this regard,
it is important for the record to reflect why the court's error is
harmful.
In civil cases, the record is the transcript (pleadings, motions, orders, written discovery, etc.) on file with the clerk and the statement
of facts (as taken by the court reporter during both trial and hearings). It is axiomatic that the trial court's ruling should be reflected in
the statement of facts or recorded by a signed written order. The
same is true of motions made by any party. At each stage of the trial,
it is important to take time to reflect on whether all of the motions,
rulings, and other evidence which indicates harm are included in the
appellate record. This short thought process will ensure successes on
appeal.
Of the four steps mentioned above, three are established by the record. Obviously, the record must show the request, the refusal, and
any resultant harm. The question of whether the court's action is error is reserved for the legal authorities that will be briefed on appeal.
However, in many instances, valid appeals are denied because parties
did not take the requisite steps to ensure that the record was properly
preserved. Naturally, this negligence results in embarrassment,
losses, and occasionally malpractice suits. Hopefully, this article will
help trial practitioners avoid these pitfalls.
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